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THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE WITH EMPLOYEE
NONCOMPETE CLAUSES: CONSTRAINTS ON
EMPLOYEES FLOURISH AND DO REAL DAMAGE
IN THE LAND OF ECONOMIC LIBERTY
Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt,† Xiaohan Sun,†† and Phillip J. Jones†††
“Open, competitive markets are a foundation of economic liberty. But
markets that suffer from a lack of competition can result in a host of
harms. In uncompetitive markets, firms with market power can raise
prices for consumers, depress wages for workers, and choke off new
entrants and other upstarts.” FTC Commissioner Rohit Chopra1

I. INTRODUCTION
Agreements not to compete are generally an anathema to free market
advocates. Independent profit maximization is one of the fundamental
assumptions of the neoclassical economic model and necessary to its
conclusion that markets yield results that are Pareto efficient. 2 Consistent
with this theory, and practical experience, agreements among competitors, or
potential competitors, to divide a market, or fix price or quantity are per se
violations under our antitrust laws.3

The authors would like to thank Professors Duarte Abrunhosa e Sousa and Matthew W. Finkin for
arranging comparative volume on this important topic and giving us the chance to participate in this
important project. Professor Dau-Schmidt would like to dedicate this article to his father, Glenn DauSchmidt, who, despite the miles, taught him: how to use tools, build a pinewood derby car, fix a bike,
work on a farm, repair a sink, build a tree house, work hard, play cards, take care of family, play with
kids, be a wonderful father, and age gracefully.
† Willard and Margaret Carr Professor of Labor and Employment Law, Indiana UniversityBloomington. B.A. 1978, University of Wisconsin-Madison; M.A. 1981, J.D. 1981, Ph.D. (Economics)
1984, University of Michigan-Ann Arbor.
†† Assistant Professor of Law, Xiamen University. L.L.B. 2013, Northwest University of Politics
and Law, Xi’an, China; L.L.M. 2015, Indiana University-Bloomington; S.J.D. 2018, Indiana UniversityBloomington.
††† Associate at Ogletree Deakins (Indianapolis); J.D. 2021, Indiana University-Bloomington.
1. Rohit Chopra (FTC Commissioner) remarks on noncompetes and other issues related to
competition in the labor market: https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1408196
/chopra_-_comment_to_hearing_1_9-6-18.pdf.
2. Under the First Theorem of Welfare Economics, competitive markets yield pareto efficiency.
PAUL A. SAMUELSON ET AL., Chapter 8 ECONOMICS (20th ed. 2020); ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL.,
EQUILIBRIUM AND ITS BASIC WELFARE PROPERTIES, MICROECONOMIC THEORY Ch 16 (1995).
3. RUDOLF CALLMANN & LOUIS ALTMAN, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS
AND MONOPOLIES § 4:33 (4th ed. 1983); Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890).
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Despite this fact, even some ardent free market advocates have argued
on behalf of the enforcement of covenants not to compete in the employment
relationship. 4 The traditional economic argument in favor of enforcing
noncompetes assumes that labor markets are competitive and workers freely
enter into such agreements in return for higher wages associated with work
in research on behalf of the employer and/or access to employer developed
trade secrets and customer contacts.5 This arrangement is desirable to the
employer because it helps protect his or her investment in research, trade
secrets, and customer contacts, against appropriation if the employee were to
leave to work for a competitor.6 It is argued that society also benefits from
such arrangements because the increase in production from the employer’s
investment in research and customer contacts more than make up for societal
losses due to the constraints on the employee’s labor mobility.7
However, economic theory also embraces a more sinister view of such
agreements. Given their constraints on labor mobility, there is a natural
concern that employers might use noncompetes to limit labor market
competition and perhaps product market competition. Recent discussions of
labor market monopsony power have cited the potential role of noncompetes
in extending employer power by creating “market friction” that prevents
employees from selling their labor to the highest valued use. 8 Under this
view, the covenant not only allows the employer to pay the employee less
than a competitive wage, but also raise the recruiting costs of competitors,

4. Outsource Int’l, Inc. v. Barton, 192 F.3d 662, 669–70 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, J., dissenting).
Jonathan M. Barnett & Ted Sichelmann, The Case for Noncompetes, 87 U OF CHIC. L. REV. 953 (2020);
Michael Pierce, The Value of a Per Se Rule Against Enforcing Noncompetition Agreements, 2 BUS. &
BANK. L. J. 39, 65–72 (2014).
5. Evan Starr, JJ Prescott & Norman Bishara, Noncompete Agreements in the US Labor Force,
64(1) J. OF LAW & ECON. 53(2021)(draft at 2); Maureen B. Callahan, Post-Employment Restraint
Agreements: A Reassessment, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 703 (1985); Paul H. Rubin & Peter Shedd, Human
Capital and Covenants Not to Compete, 10 J. LEG. STUD. 93 (1981).
6. In a perfect market, the employee would finance all generally valuable training and pay or bond
for access to employer trade secrets, but in the real-world employees are liquidity constrained from
financing such investments. See Rubin & Shedd, supra note 5.
7. In essence the covenant not to compete solves the employer’s “investment hold-up problem” and
allows the employer and employee to split the cooperative surplus created by combining the employee’s
labor and the employer’s capital. Id.
8. U.S. Council of Economic Advisors, Labor Market Monopsony: Trends, Consequences, and
Policy Responses, Issue Brief (2016). The argument that covenants not to compete reinforce monopsony
power is based on a simple extension of prior research on search frictions. As several authors have found,
employer monopsony power can arise from between-employer search costs. Kenneth Burdett & Dale T.
Mortensen, Wage Differentials, Employer Size, and Unemployment, 39 INT’L ECON. REV. 257 (1998);
ALAN MANNING, MONOPSONY IN MOTION: IMPERFECT COMPETITION IN LABOR MARKETS (2003).
Because covenants not to compete raise between-employer search costs it follows that such covenants can
increase monopsony power. Starr, Prescott & Bishara (2021), supra note 5, at 7 in draft. See also, Kenneth
G. Dau-Schmidt, A Bargaining Analysis of American Labor Law and the Search for Bargaining Equity
and Industrial Peace, 91 MICH. L. REV. 419, at 428–30 (1992) on employer monopsony power and
collective bargaining.
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allowing the employer to charge higher prices.9 Concern about noncompetes
is particularly acute when they are imposed on employees after acceptance
of an offer of employment, clearly challenging the assumption that they are
freely accepted in return for higher wages.10 In such cases, a covenant not to
compete can serve as an intertemporal conduit of monopsony power,
translating the employee’s short-term disadvantage in the lack of alternative
offers into long-term employer monopsony power.11 Viewed in this light, a
noncompete is a socially costly restraint on the employee’s freedom to apply
his or her labor to the highest valued use and receive a competitive wage.12
Which of these two economic views of employee noncompetes is true,
and under what circumstances, is an empirical question. The answer to this
question is important in determining whether such agreements should be
enforceable, and, if so, under what circumstances. This question is of
growing importance as the use of noncompetes has grown in our economy.
Once largely confined to contracts incident to the sale of a business or
contracts for highly compensated managers, professionals or research staff,
the use of noncompetes has spread across the American economy until they
now cover 20% of American employees13 including many positions without
access to valuable appropriable information such as a hair stylist, yoga
instructor, lawn sprayer, temporary warehouseman, sandwich-maker, dogwalker and even volunteer camp counselor and unpaid intern.14 Moreover, it
seems that few of these noncompetes are the result of bargained for exchange
and many are imposed by the employer after the job has been accepted and
without additional compensation.15 The sheer number of these agreements
9. John M. McAdams, Non-Compete Agreements: A Review of the Literature 5 (Dec. 31, 2019)
(unpublished manuscript); ORLY LOBEL, TALENT WANTS TO BE FREE: WHY WE SHOULD LEARN TO LOVE
LEAKS, RAIDS, AND FREE RIDING (2013).
10. Starr, Prescott & Bishara (2021), supra note 5, at 2 in draft; Evan Starr, Are Noncompetes
Holding Down Wages?, at 7, Addresses at Unrigging the Labor Market: Convening to Restore
Competitive Labor Markets Harvard Law School (June 13, 2018).
11. Starr, Prescott & Bishara (2021), supra note 5, at 2 in draft.
12. Lobel, supra note 9.
13. Starr, Prescott & Bishara (2021), supra note 5. A more recent, but less comprehensive estimate
puts the total percent of the American work force covered by noncompetes at between 27.8% and 46.5%.
Alexander J.S. Colvin & Heidi Shierholz, Noncompete Agreements: Ubiquitous, Harmful to Wages and
to Competition, and Part of a Growing Trend of Employers Requiring Workers to Sign Away Their Rights,
ECON. POL’Y INST. (2019).
14. Steven Greenhouse, Non-compete Clauses Increasingly Pop Up in Array of Jobs, N.Y. TIMES,
June 8, 2014, at B1; Dave Jamieson, Jimmy John’s Makes Low-Wage Workers Sign ‘Oppressive’ Noncompete Agreements, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 13, 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014
/10/13/jimmy-johns-non-compete_n_5978180.html; Dave Jamieson, Doggy Day Care Chain Makes Pet
Sitters Sign Non-competes To Protect ‘Trade Secrets, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 24, 2014); Spencer
Woodman, Amazon Makes Even Temporary Warehouse Workers Sign 18-Month Non-competes, VERGE
(Mar. 26, 2015), http://www.theverge.com/2015/3/26/8280309/amazon-warehouse-jobs-exclusive-noncompete-contracts.
15. Micheal Lipsitz & Evan Starr, Low-Wage Workers and the Enforceability of No-Compete
Agreements, 68 MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 143 (2021) Starr, Prescott and Bishara found that 29.3% of
employees with a noncompete clause first learned of the clause only after they had accepted the job.
Moreover, when presented with a noncompete, only 10% of employees report negotiating over the clause.
Starr, Prescott & Bishara (2021), supra note 5, Table 7.
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and the potentially deleterious impact they might have on peoples’ careers,
our labor market and our economy has provided impetus for possible
remedial legislation at both the state and federal levels.16 Fortunately, there
are a number of very good empirical studies that examine the number and
circumstance of such agreements and the impact of these agreements on
workers, firms and our economy.17
In this article, we examine the American experience with employee
covenants not to compete. We discuss first their treatment under the common
law and statutes codifying the common law. Next, we review the recent
empirical literature and discuss its findings with respect to their prevalence
in the American workforce and their impact on the affected workers, firms
and the economy. Based on this empirical work we conclude that
noncompetes are over-used in the American economy having a deleterious
effect on employee wages and mobility and the vibrancy of our economy,
with no comparable increase in employer investment in research or training.
Thus, we find that, for most employees, the negative economic view of
noncompetes is more accurate and such agreements are used to extend
employer control over employees. Employers also suffer from noncompetes
because these agreements have become an obstacle to hiring qualified staff.
Finally, we discuss efforts at the state and federal level to regulate the use of
noncompetes to ameliorate the abuse of these restrictions. We evaluate these
legislative efforts in light of the recent empirical work on the problems
caused by noncompetes.
II. THE AMERICAN COMMON LAW
A “covenant not to compete” or “noncompete” is an agreement between
an employer and employee that the employee will not work for a competitor
of the employer or start his or her own business in competition with the
employer, after leaving employment. Such agreements are generally limited
in duration, geographic scope and the scope of the covered activity. A
commonly cited example is the covenant Jimmy John’s has asked its
sandwich-makers to sign:
Non-Competition Covenant. Employee covenants and agrees that, during
his or her employment . . . and for a period of two (2) years after . . .
termination, . . . he or she will not have any direct or indirect interest in
or perform services for . . . any business which derives more than ten
percent (10%) of its revenue from selling submarine, hero-type, deli-style,

16. See infra, note 145, and accompanying text. Empirical estimates of the percent of the American
workforce covered by noncompetes vary from 18.1% to 27.8%. Starr, Prescott & Bishara (2021), supra
note 5, (18.1%); Colvin & Shierholz, supra note 13, (27.8%).
17. McAdams 2019, supra note 9.
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pita and or wrapped or rolled sandwiches and which is located within
three (3) miles of . . . any such other JIMMY JOHN’S© Sandwich Shop.18

Such a covenant may be part of a written “four corners” employment
contract, an enforceable employee handbook, or a separate signed agreement
among the oral and written representations that constitute the employment
contract.19
In the United States there is no federal law that is currently used to
regulate employment noncompetes. Eric Posner has made a convincing
argument that policing noncompetes should be part of the Department of
Justice (DOJ) competition policy under the Sherman Act, but to date such
enforcement has been scarce and ineffective.20 Labor market concentration
is also not currently part of the merger review process for either the DOJ or
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).21 Similarly, despite the fact that 18
State Attorneys General have petitioned22 the FTC to adopt rules regulating
noncompetes as an “unfair method of competition” under the Federal Trade
Commission Act,23 nothing has yet come of this proposal.
Instead, in the United States, covenants not to compete are governed by
state common law and statute. Although three states and the District of
Columbia have passed statues prohibiting the enforcement of noncompetes,24
and at least fourteen more states have enacted statutory schemes that vary
significantly from the common law, 25 thirty-three states still treat the
question of the legality of noncompetes under the common law standard with

18. K. DAU-SCHMIDT ET AL, LEGAL PROTECTION FOR THE INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEE 239-40 (6th ed.
2021).
19. M. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 710 (3rd ed. 2005).
20. Eric A. Posner, The Antitrust Challenge to Covenants Not to Compete in Employment Contracts,
83 ANTITRUST L.J. 165 (2020). However, the antitrust laws pose an obstacle to employers’ use of “nopoach agreements.” The DOJ has brought cases against several tech companies, including Apple and
Google, for labor market collusion. Alan B. Krueger & Eric A. Posner, A Proposal for Protecting LowIncome Workers from Monopoly and Collusion, THE HAMILTON PROJECT 4 (2018). The FTC has also
brought cases against firms that tried to collude in the labor market for nurses and fashion models. Federal
Trade Commission (FTC). 1995, June. “Council of Fashion Designers of America.” Press Release, Federal
Trade Commission, Washington DC. Finally, the DOJ and the FTC issued joint guidance that it is illegal
for firms to agree not to hire each other’s employees or to restrict wages. ANTITRUST DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDANCE FOR HUMAN RESOURCE PROFESSIONALS 3
(2016).
21. Krueger & Posner, supra note 20, at 4; see also, Suresh Naidu, Eric A. Posner, & E. Glen Wey,
Antitrust Remedies for Labor Market Power, 132 HARV. L. REV. 536 (2018); Hiba Hafiz, Interagency
Merger Review in Labor Markets, 95 CHI. KENT L. REV. 37 (2020).
22. Federal Trade Commission Hearings on Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st
Century, Public Comments of 18 State Attorneys General on Labor Issues in Antitrust (July 15, 2019).
23. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (a) (1) (1914).
24. See N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 9-08-06 (West, Westlaw through legislation effective Jan. 1,
2020); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 1 of 2020 Reg. Sess.); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, § 219A (West, Westlaw through First Regular Session of the 57th Legislature (2019)); and
D.C. CODE § 32-1301 et seq (2021).
25. Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana,
Nevada, Oregon, Rhode Island, Virginia, and Washington. Stewart J. Schwab, Report to the Study
Committee on Covenants Not to Compete, Uniform Law Commission, Appendix Table A-1 (12/13/2019)
(updated by the authors).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3870403

590

COMP. LABOR LAW & POL’Y JOURNAL

[Vol.42:585

eleven of these states codifying that standard (See Figure 1).26 In this section
we outline the American common law doctrine on the enforcement of
covenants as represented in court opinions and sates statutes.

A. Noncompetes Are Presumed Invalid, Subject to Reasonableness
The earliest cases in both the United Kingdom and the United States established
the common law principle that any restraints on competition were departures from
the principle of economic freedom and therefore void and unenforceable. 27 This
principle derived as much from the judges’ abhorrence to the idea that men could sell
their economic liberty as it did from the economic mischief such agreements might

26. The states codifying the common law test are: Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Michigan,
Missouri, New Hampshire, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, and Wisconsin. The states relying primarily on
the common law without significant statutes include: Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North
Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
Virginia still relies primarily on the common law standard but has an important exception for low wage
workers. Id.
27. Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625, 631–32, 644
(1960) (discussing Dyer’s Case, Y.B. Mich. 2 Hen. 5, f. 5, pl. 26 (C.P. 1414)); Colgate v. Bacheler, Cro.
Eliz. 872, 78 Eng. Rep. 1097 (Q.B. 1602); Lawrence v. Kidder, 10 Barb. 641 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1851); and
Keeler v. Taylor, 53 Pa. 467, 470 (1866).
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make.28 Interestingly, the restraints that prompted this strong pronouncement were
almost all restraints on employees that left their employer; “cases of ‘unethical’
masters attempting to prolong the traditional period of subservience of an apprentice
or journeyman”.29 However, the courts later developed the idea that covenants not
to compete that were “ancillary” to a valid agreement could be enforceable in limited
circumstances, and thus treated employment noncompetes in a fashion similar to
covenants not to compete pursuant to the sale of a business, partnership agreements,
assignments of patent rights, and leases of business property.30
The case of Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wms. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B. 1711),
which involved a covenant not to compete incident to the sale of a bakery, announced
the “rule of reason” that governed covenants not to compete ancillary to another
contract. In this case, the Queen’s Bench held that restraints on trade were presumed
invalid, but this presumption could be overcome by a showing that the restraint was
reasonable in furtherance of the underlying contract, such restraints being necessary
for the sale of a business at a fair price.31 However the court made it clear that the
burden of showing a just reason might be greater in the case of a covenant ancillary
to an employment contract because such covenants are subject to “great abuses . . .
from masters, who are apt to give their apprentices much vexation on this account,
and to use many indirect practices to procure such bonds from them, lest they should
prejudice them in their custom, when they come up to set up for themselves.”32 Thus,
even in the case that gave birth to the “rule of reason,” the Judges realized there was
need for particular skepticism in the case of a noncompete ancillary to an
employment contract. The court’s opinion was the most cited analysis of the problem
of noncompetes on both sides of the Atlantic for the next 250 years.33 By the end of
the nineteenth century, this rule of reason analysis was well entrenched in both Great
Britain and the United States.34
In the surge of cases that attended the industrial revolution, with its increase in
labor mobility and reliance on contract to mediate the employment relationship, the
courts further developed the idea of “reasonable restraints” and distinguished the
common law test for noncompetes ancillary to an employment contract from that for

28. Id. at 650. “[A]greements that restrict an employee from competing with his or her employer
upon termination of employment are judicially disfavored because ‘powerful considerations of public
policy . . . militate against sanctioning the loss of a[person’s] livelihood.’” Brown & Brown, Inc. v.
Johnson, 980 N.Y.S.2d 631, 637 (App. Div. 2014) (quoting Reed, Roberts Assocs. v. Strauman, 335
N.E.2d 590, 593 (N.Y. 1976)).
29. Id. at 632.
30. Id. at note 3.
31. 1 P. Wms. at 182, 186, 24 Eng. Rep. at 348, 349.
32. 1 P. Wms at 190, 24 Eng. Rep. at 350.
33. See Blake, supra note 27, at 629.
34. Blake argues that Mitchel v. Reynolds was the dominant case on noncompetes until the end of
the nineteenth century, by which time the “rule of reason” for judging such contracts ancillary to another
contract was well established on both sides of the Atlantic. Id. at 644. See for example, Horner v Graves,
7 Bing. 735, 131 Eng. Rep. 284 (C.P. 1831); Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns & Ammunition Co.,
[1894] A.C. 535, affirming [1893] 1 Ch. 630 (C.A. 1892); Morse Twist Drill & Mach. Co. v. Morse, 103
Mass. 73 (1869); and Mandeville v. Harman, 42 N.J. Eq. 185, 7 Atl. 37 (Ch. 1886).
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noncompetes ancillary to other agreements.35 Although a covenant not to compete is
always necessary to the successful sale of business goodwill, it is only sometimes
important in the employment of a worker and then only under fairly definable
circumstances.36 Thus, early on, the courts determined that, in employment cases,
the employer must show some “legitimate interest” in having a covenant not to
compete as a prerequisite to applying a test of reasonableness.37 Legitimate interests
included: the sale of a business by the employee to the employer, engagement of the
employee to do research on behalf of the employer, or employer investments in
confidential business information, customer relations or the reputation of the
employee.38 This requirement of a legitimate employer interest would naturally go
on to shape the test of reasonableness in employment cases since the covenant’s
breadth of coverage in duration, geography and proscribed activities could only be
reasonable to the extent necessary to protect the legitimate interest, 39 with a
minimum of necessary burden on the employee.40 In considering the reasonableness
of the constraint, American courts have also considered whether there is evidence of
a bargained-for exchange,41 the circumstances of the termination,42 and whether the
covenant violates the public interest 43 or works an undue hardship on the
employee.44
Perhaps one of the best statements of the modern American common law test
for covenants not to compete ancillary to an employment contract was made in the
case of Buffkin v. Glacier Group, 997 N.E. 2d 1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). In that case,
the Court declined to enforce a noncompete against a “headhunter” who had been
employed to find candidates to fill jobs at IT firms under contract with his employer
and was then later employed in the same capacity by another firm with different
35. The “rule of reason” has developed somewhat differently in its many applications under
American law. Perhaps its marquee application came in Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States,
221 U.S. 1 (1911) where the Supreme Court used it to interpret Section 1 of the Sherman Act to prohibit
only “unreasonable restraints” on trade, in which the anti-competitive effects of the restraint exceeded its
pro-competitive effects.
36. See Blake, supra note 27, at 646–47.
37. See, e.g., Arthur Murray Dance Studios, Inc. v. Witter, 62 Ohio L. Abs. 17, 28, 105 N.E.2d 685,
691 (C.P. 1952).
38. See Blake, supra note 27, at 653–74.
39. Arthur Murray Dance Studios, Inc., 105 N.E.2d at 691. See Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 94, 144–45
(1955); see also, Blake, supra note 27, at 676–80.
40. See, e.g., Sonotone Corp. v. Baldwin, 227 N.C. 387, 42 S.E.2d 352 (1947); see also, Blake, supra
note 27, at 683–84.
41. See, e.g., Baker v. Bristol Care, Inc., 450 S.W.3d 770 (Mo. 2014) (“The first relevant principle
of consideration is that it is a bargained for exchange.”); Insulation Corp. of America v. Brabston, 667
A.2d 729, 733–34 (Pa. Super. 1995) (higher scrutiny required for covenants between employer and
employee due to unequal bargaining power).
42. See, e.g., Arthur Murray Dance Studios, Inc., 105 N.E.2d at 700 (considering the circumstances
of termination among many other factors); Missett v. Hub Int’l Pennsylvania, LLC, 2010 PA Super 178,
6 A.3d 530 (2010).
43. See, e.g., Eureka Laundry Co. v. Long, 146 Wis. 205, 209–10, 131 N.W. 412, 413 (1911); The
Cmty. Hosp. Grp., Inc. v. More, 183 N.J. 36 (2005) (geographic restrictions in physician’s noncompete
were injurious to public interest).
44. See, e.g., N. Star Mgmt. of Am., LLC v. Sedlacek, 235 N.C. App. 588, 595 (2014); Nat. Organics,
Inc. v. Kirkendall, 52 A.D.3d 488, 489 (2008); see also, Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 515(b) (Am.
L. Inst. 1981).
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customers. The court stated that covenants not to compete are “strongly disfavored”
and enforceable only if the employer shows a “legitimate protectable interest” and
that the covenant is “reasonable” as to its duration, proscribed activities, and
geographic scope.45 Legitimate protectable interests included customer contacts and
trade secrets, but not training in general skills.46 In judging the reasonableness of the
restraint, the court should consider the scope of the employer’s legitimate interest.47
In this case the court found that the employee had no access to the firm’s customers
and had benefited merely from on the job training in general skills. As a result, the
employer’s legitimate interest was negligible and certainly inadequate to support a
three-year, nationwide prohibition on working in any capacity for a firm in employee
recruiting.48 The court also saw fit to remind us that contractual provisions should
be narrowly construed against the drafter (here the employer) and that the employee’s
“agreement” that the terms of the covenant were “reasonable” was inconsequential
to the court’s determination.49

B. The Prerequisite of an Employer Legitimate Interest
As discussed in the previous section, an employer showing of a legitimate
protectable interest is a prerequisite to enforcement of a covenant not to compete.
Without a legitimate employer interest, there is no need to gauge the reasonableness
of the constraint. The two clearest instances of employer legitimate interest are the
sale of a business by the employee to the employer50 and where the employee is
specifically engaged to conduct research on behalf of the employer. 51 These cases
are generally limited to high paid employees and easily identifiable transactions in
which the noncompete is an essential feature because the employee has already been
paid for business goodwill or the employer is trying to protect research investments.
Indeed, in the case of a sale of a business, the noncompete is generally ancillary to
the transfer of the business and its goodwill, not the employment of the seller, and so
that this case does not even need to be treated under the doctrine of employment
noncompetes. 52 In the case in which an employee is specifically engaged to
undertake research for the employer, the traditional common law remedy is for the
employer to negotiate agreements and “holdover agreements” requiring the

45. Buffkin v. Glacier Grp., 9–11 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) 997 N.E.2d 1.
46. Id. at 10–11.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 13–15.
49. Id. at 15.
50. See Restatement (Third) of Employment Law: Protectable Interests for Restrictive Covenants §
8.07 cmt. e (Am. Law Inst. 2015); see also, Dominic Wenzell, D.M.D. P.C., v. Ingrim, 228 P.3d 103, 111
(Alaska 2010); and Hospital Consultants, Inc. v. Potyka, 531 S.W.2d 657 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
51. Blake, supra note 27, at 629; Universal Winding Co. v. Clarke, 108 F. Supp. 329 (D. Conn.
1952).
52. See, e.g., Zimmer Melia & Assocs., Inc. v. Stallings, No. 3:08-0663, 2008 WL 3887664 (M.D.
Tenn. Aug. 21, 2008); Pope v. Rosenberg, 2015 WY 142, 361 P.3d 824, 829 (Wyo. 2015).
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assignment of any copyrightable or patentable discoveries. 53 These agreements are
generally negotiated in advance of employment with employees who have other
employment options and such agreements are readily enforceable. Noncompetes are
sometimes used in addition to agreement requiring the reassignment of copyrights
and patents.
The harder and more interesting cases are those in which the employer retains
the employee to perform services, for which the employee is paid, and the
employee’s work benefits from the employer’s investment in information or
relationships that might be appropriable when the employee leaves. The most
commonly recognized of such interests, are employer investments in trade secrets,
customer contacts and the employee’s reputation in the market.54 To qualify as a
legitimate interest under the common law test, a trade secret must meet the common
law requirements that: (1) it derives independent economic value from being kept
secret, (2) the employer has taken reasonable measures to keep it secret, such as
limited access, password protection and confidentiality agreements; and (3) the
information is not readily known or ascertainable by the general public or people in
the industry.55 Investments in customer contacts that can qualify include: (1) formal
customer lists developed at the employer’s expense, which are themselves trade
secrets and are treated as such; and (2) customer contacts developed at the expense
of the employer where, due to the nature of the work, there is a substantial risk of
loss of clientele to the employee if he or she leaves, for example medical care. 56 As
a general rule, courts will not protect employer customer contacts absent express
contractual restraints,57 although high ranking officers of a company who occupy a
position of special trust may be held to a higher fiduciary duty in such matters. 58
Employer investments in the employee’s reputation in the industry are treated as

53. K. DAU-SCHMIDT ET AL., LEGAL PROTENTION FOR THE INDIVIDUAL Employee (6th ed. 2021) at
244; John A. Thomas, Who Owns the Invention? The Rights of Employers, Employees, and Contractors,
62 TEX. B.J. 996 (1999). Indeed, courts will sometimes infer an agreement to assign patents if an employee
is specifically hired to do research for the employer. Speck v. North Carolina Dairy Foundation, Inc., 311
N.C. 679, 319 S.E.2d 139, 19 Ed. Law Rep. 737 (1984).
54. See, e.g., Gaver v. Scheider O.K. Tire Co., 289 Neb. 491, 503 (2014); Thiesing v. Dentsply Int’l,
Inc., 748 F. Supp. 2s 932 (E.D. Wis. 2010).
55. Ikon Off. Sols., Inc. v. Dale 170 F. Supp. 2d 892, 897 (D. Minn), aff’d, 22 F. App’x 647 (8th
Cir. 2001); National Tube Co. v. Eastern Tube Co., 13–23 Ohio C.C. Dec. 468, 470 (1902), aff’d, 69 Ohio
St. 560, 70 N.E. 1127 (1903); see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 757, cmt. b (1939). In determining the
value of the information, the most important factor is generally the investment of time effort and money
the employer has had to make to generate the information. Kelite Corp. v. Khem Chems., Inc., 162 F.
Supp. 332 (N.D. Ill. 1958); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Powers Film Prods., Inc., 189 App. Div. 556, 179 N.Y.
Supp. 325 (1919). The employer is generally required to undertake all reasonable efforts to keep the
information secret. Excelsior Steel Furnace Co. v. Williamson Heater Co., 269 Fed. 614 (6th Cir. 1921);
Arthur Murray Dance Studios, Inc., 105 N.E.2d at 709; Restatement (First) Torts § 757, comment b–
secrecy (1939).
56. Allen v. Rose Park Pharmacy, 120 Utah 608, 237 P.2d 823 (1951). See also, Arthur Murray
Dance Studios, Inc., 105 N.E.2d at 705–09; Cent. Indiana Podiatry, P.C. v. Krueger, 882, N.E.2d 723, 729
(Ind. 2008).
57. Blake, supra note 27, at 655; RUDOLF CALLMANN, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS
834–49 (2d ed. 1950); RISDALE ELLIS, TRADE SECRETS 72 (1953); supra note 3, § 157.
58. Blake, supra note 27, at 655, 661–62.
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business goodwill and can qualify as a legitimate protectable interest.59 For example,
an employer’s investment in promoting the fame and reputation of a radio discjockey or TV personality.60 As with the sale of a business and employment to do
research, the employer’s trade secrets, including customer lists, also enjoy protection
under the common law doctrine of trade secrets which has been codified in fortyeight states under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.61
Although some courts have held that an employer can use noncompetes to
protect “key employees” or to protect investments in training the employee,62 these
are minority positions without general support in the common law. 63 Several courts
have ruled that employers cannot enforce noncompetes just because an employee is
very skilled and valuable in the industry.64 It is also well established that an employer
cannot use a covenant not to compete to help retain an employee long enough to
recoup employer investments in training that are generally valuable. 65 In a perfect
labor market, employers would pay for training particular to their job and employees
would pay for general training that is of value to multiple employers. 66 However,
due to liquidity constraints on employees’ ability to borrow to finance education,
employers do sometimes pay for general training, the value of which is appropriable
by the employee if he or she leaves. 67 Rather than a noncompete, the accepted
solution to this problem is for the employer to bind the employee to proportionately
reimburse the employer for demonstrable costs, such as tuition and books, if the
employee leaves within a reasonable specified period. 68 Finally, courts are more
skeptical of covenants not to compete if the employee has not been employed for any
significant time before discharge on the theory that, absent a formula or customer

59. See, e.g., Post-Newsweek Station v. Brooks, No. CV 94 704854, 1994 WL 110040 (Conn. Sup.
Ct. March 11, 1994) (news anchor); Daniel v. Trade Winds Travel, Inc., 532 So. 2d 653, 654 (Ala. 1988)
(travel agent).
60. Cathy Packer & Johanna Cleary, Rediscovering the Public Interest: An Analysis of the Common
Law Governing Post-Employment Non-compete Contracts for Media Employees, 24 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 1073 (2007).
61. The Uniform Trade Secrets Act has been adopted in 48 states and the District of Columbia. The
only exceptions are New York and North Carolina. New York protects trade secrets under the common
law doctrine and North Carolina has its own protective statute, the “Trade Secrets Protection Act”. Fox
Rothschild, LLC, National Survey on Restrictive Covenants (July 2020). Uniform Trade Secrets Act §§
1-12 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 529–659 (2005).
62. See e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-113.
63. Restatement (Third) of Employment Law § 8.07 (Am. Law Inst. 2015).
64. Chavers v. Copy Prods., Inc, 519 So 2d 942, 945 (Ala. 1988). However, by statute Idaho limits
the application of covenants not to compete to “key employees” who are more likely to have benefited
from appropriable investments. A “key employee” is defined in the statute as those “who, by reason of
the employer’s investment . . . have gained a high level of inside knowledge, influence, credibility,
notoriety, fame, reputation or public persona as a representative or spokesperson of the employer . . .”
Idaho Code §§44-2702 (1).
65. See Blake, supra note 27, at 652–53. See, e.g., Mutual Loan Co. v. Pierce, 245 Iowa 1051, 65
N.W.2d 405 (1954); Club Aluminum Co. v. Young, 263 Mass. 223, 160 N.E. 804 (1928).
66. GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS, WITH SPECIAL
REFERENCE TO EDUCATION 33–51 (3d ed. 1993).
67. See Rubin & Shedd, supra note 5, at 96–97.
68. Stuart Lichten & Eric M. Fink, Just When I Thought I Was Out: Post-Employment Repayment
Obligations, 25 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 51 (2018).
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list, the employee has not been employed long enough for the employer to invest in
the relationship.69

C. The Reasonableness of the Constraints
Covenants not to compete are enforced only if they are reasonable in their
duration, proscribed activities, and geographic scope.70 The reasonableness of the
covenant’s constraints are judged in light of the employer’s legitimate interest. 71
Constraints are accepted only so far as they are necessary to protect that interest.72
Whether constraints of a given duration, activity proscription and geographic scope
are reasonable depend on the circumstances of the case and the nature of the interest
being protected. 73 For example, in judging the reasonableness of geographic
constraints, it matters whether the interest to be protected is a customer list or a
production methods trade secret. The geographic area necessary to protect a customer
list would extend only to the area over which existing customers did business.
However, to effectively protect the value of a trade secret in production processes, a
reasonable geographic area might be world-wide since once the process is known
outside the firm it could easily spread back to the employer’s current market.74 In
protecting customer contacts, generally an employer can only restrict the employee
from dealing with customers the employee actually served at the firm, not just any
customer of the employer. 75 By court opinion or statute, several states have
established a presumptively reasonable duration, or a maximum duration, for
covenants not to compete; most often two years.76

69. See Russell Beck, Employee Non-competes A State-by-State Survey, FAIR COMPETITION L. (Jun.
7, 2021), https://faircompetitionlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Noncompetes-50-State-SurveyChart-20210607.pdf (“Illinois may require two years of employment before any noncompete can be
enforced.”).
70. See, e.g., Market*Access Int’l, Inc. v. KMD Media, LLC 72 Va. Cir. 355, 3 (2006) (“Central to
the reasonableness of these agreements is whether there are reasonable limits on duration, geographic area
and whether the scope of the restrictions is narrowly tailored to protect the employer’s interest.”); Outdoor
Lighting Persps. Franchising, Inc. v. Harders, 228 N.C. App. 613, 623 (2013).
71. See, e.g., Smart Corp. v. Grider, 650 N.E.2d 80, 83 (Ind. App. 1995) (“A covenant not to compete
must be sufficiently specific in scope to coincide with only the legitimate interests of the employer . . .”);
Veramark Techs., Inc. v. Bouk, 10 F. Supp. 3d 395, 406 (W.D.N.Y. 2014).
72. See, e.g., Id.; Allright Auto Parks, Inc. v. Berry, 219 Tenn. 280, 285–86 (1966) (“It is generally
agreed that, before a noncompetitive covenant will be upheld as reasonable and therefore enforceable, the
time and territorial limits involved must be no greater than is necessary to protect the business interests of
the employer.”).
73. See, e.g., Cent. Water Works Supply, Inc. v. Fisher, 240 Ill. App. 3d 952, 956 (1993) (“Courts
evaluate [noncompetes] differently because of the difference in the nature of the interests sought to be
protected.”).
74. See, e.g., Kadant Johnson, Inc. v. D’Amico, No. CIV.A. 10-2869, 2012 WL 1605458 (E.D. La.
May 8, 2012) (“Where an employer has business interests throughout the world, a non-competition
agreement without a specified geographic scope is not unreasonable.”).
75. See, e.g., DataType Int’l, Inc. v. Puzia, 797 F. Supp. 274, 285 (S.D.N.Y.).
76. See, e.g., TP Grp.-CI, Inc. v. Vetecnik, Civil Action No. 1:16-cv-00623-RGA, 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 138980, *5 (D. Del. Oct. 6, 2016) (“Delaware courts have routinely found restrictive covenants
with a duration of two years to be reasonable in duration.”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921. See also,
Beck, supra note 69, updated by Beck Reed Riden, 50 State Noncompete Chart (6/27/21)
https://beckreedriden.com/50-state-noncompete-chart-2/. (Alabama (2 years), Arkansas (2 years),
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In judging the reasonableness of a covenant not to compete, some courts have
considered whether alternative remedies including less restrictive covenants, could
adequately protect the employer’s legitimate interest and impinge less on the
employee’s economic freedom. 77 As previously mentioned, almost all the
recognized legitimate employer interests have alternate means of protection.
Noncompetes incident to the sale of a business are enforceable on their own terms.78
Patentable discoveries made by research employees with the employer’s resources
can be made subject to assignment and holdover agreements. 79 The appropriation of
trade secrets is actionable in all fifty states and the District of Columbia, 80 and can
also be protected through confidentiality agreements. 81 Customer lists are
protectable as trade secrets and customer relations are protectable through nonsolicitation agreements.82 These alternative solutions seem preferable to a general
noncompete clause because they ask the employer to identify and protect their
interest in advance of the enforcement of the clause and they impose only the
restrictions on the employee that are necessary to protect that interest. Moreover,
they generally do not need the specification of geographic or durational parameters.83
Only in cases where these interests would inevitably be undermined by the employee
working for a competitor, or in which proof problems would prevent these less
restrictive methods from being effective might a noncompete be warranted. The only
recognized legitimate employer interests that have no alternative remedy to a
noncompete are employer investments in employee goodwill with customers and the
public at large.

Georgia (varying), Idaho (18 months), Louisiana (2 years), Michigan (1 year), Oregon (12 months), South
Dakota (2 years), and Washington (18 months)).
77. Hartman v. W.H. Odell and Assocs., Inc., 450 S.E.2d 912, 918–920 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994);
DataType lnt’l, Inc. v. Puzia, 797 F. Supp. 274, 285–286 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (upholding a nonsolicitation
clause but declining to enforce a noncompetition covenant); Farr Assocs. v. Baskin, 530 S.E.2d 878, 882
(N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (invalidating a worldwide clause and declaring that a reasonable clause would cover
only those clients with whom the employee actually dealt).
78. C. T. Drechsler, Enforceability of covenant against competition, ancillary to sale or other transfer
of business, practice, or property, as affected by territorial extent of restriction, 46 A.L.R.2d 119 (1982).
79. Ownership of Invention, 37 No. 2 Corp Couns Quarterly ART 4 (2021); Steven Cherensky, A
Penny for Their Thoughts: Employee-Inventors, Preinvention Assignment Agreements, Property, and
Personhood, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 597 (1993).
80. Paul M. Coltoff, J.D.; John A. Gebauer, J.D.; and Barbara J. Van Arsdale, 42 Am. Jur. 2d
Injunctions § 72. Persons subject to restrictions on taking trade secrets for purposes of injunction against
use or disclosure of such information (2022).
81. Richard E. Kaye, Cause of Action for Breach of Confidentiality or Nondisclosure Agreement in
Employment Contract, 47 COA2d 115 (2011); Carol M. Bast, At What Price Silence: Are Confidentiality
Agreements Enforceable?, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 627 (1999).
82. David L. Johnson, The Parameters of “Solicitation” in an Era of Non-Solicitation Covenants,
28 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 99 (2012); DONALD J. ASPELUND & JOAN E. BECKNER, EMPLOYEE
NONCOMPETITION LAW Chapter 9 (2014).
83. Sperry Rand Corp. v. Rothlein, 241 F. Supp. 549, 564, 143 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 172 (D. Conn. 1964).
See generally, Sayko, Jr., New and Terminating Employees, 14 AIPLA Q.J. 50, 57–58 (1986).
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D. Evidence of a “Bargained-for Exchange”:
Additional Consideration and the Timing of the “Offer”
The potential benefits of restrictive covenants to employees and society at large
are most transparent when the covenant is the result of a bargained for exchange
between the employer and employee in which the employee receives higher wages
in exchange for the constraint because the employee’s productivity is increased
through his or her utilization of the employer’s potentially appropriable investments
in research, customer contacts and reputation. Although a similar exchange is
theoretically possible through an employer unilateral offer after the beginning of the
employment relationship in a labor market in which the employee had viable
alternative jobs, one must have a very optimistic view of the efficient operation of
the labor market to rely on this possibility.
With a more realistic appreciation of the limitations of labor markets, judges
and legislators have worried that covenants imposed by employer unilateral offer,
without significant additional consideration, especially after the employee has given
up other options and begun work at the firm, represent an effort to increase or extend
employer bargaining power and exploit the worker. 84 In such circumstances,
employee noncompetes might be viewed as contracts of adhesion which are subject
to more scrutiny by the courts. 85 In most American states, the continuing
employment of an employee can act as adequate consideration for a covenant not to
compete that is unilaterally imposed by an employer even after the employee has
already begun work for the employer.86 However, a growing number of jurisdictions
are skeptical of such arrangements, with fourteen requiring additional consideration,
especially if the covenant is imposed after the employee begins work for the
employer. 87 Moreover, at least nine states now require, through court opinion or
statute, that a covenant not to compete be raised before the acceptance of the job
offer in order to be effective.88 As will be discussed later in this article, the empirical
84. Starr, Prescott & Bishara (2021), supra note 5, at 2 in draft; Starr, supra note 10, at 7; see e.g.,
Timenterial, Inc. v. Dagata, 277 A.2d 512, 515 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1971) (refusing to enforce a restrictive
covenant because it lacked consideration when the employee signed it five days after beginning
employment); Hopper v. All Pet Animal Clinic, Inc., 861 P.2d 531, 541 (Wyo. 1993) (declaring that the
“better view, even in the at-will relationship, is to require additional consideration to support a restrictive
covenant entered into during the term of the employment”).
85. Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1174,
1242–43 (1983).
86. See, e.g., Clark v. Liberty Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 592 So. 2d 564, 567 (Ala. 1992); Water Servs. v.
Midland Research Labs., Inc., 596 F. Supp. 412, 415 (E.D. Ark. 1984); Ackerman v. Kimball Int’l, Inc.,
652 N.E.2d 507,509 (Ind. 1995).
87. Michael Selmi, Trending and the Restatement of Employment Law’s Provisions on Employee
Mobility, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 1369, 1380–81 (2015). See, e.g., Access Organics, Inc. v. Hernandez, 175
P.3d 899, 903 (Mont. 2008) (after employment has begun, a noncompete requires independent
consideration); Hopper v. All Pet Animal Clinic, Inc., 861 P.2d 531, 540 (Wyo. 1993) (continued
employment alone does not provide the necessary consideration to support a noncompete entered into
after the employment relationship has begun).
88. States with judicial holdings that noncompetes must be raised before acceptance of the job offer
include Connecticut, North Carolina and Wyoming. States with statutes requiring that noncompetes be
raised before acceptance of the job offer include Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Oregon,
and Washington. Beck Reed Riden, 50 State Survey (6/27/21).
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work to date suggests that the growing skepticism of unilaterally imposed covenants
after the employee has already started work is warranted.89

E. The Circumstances of the Employee’s Separation from Work
American courts have also weighed the circumstances under which the
employee’s work is terminated in deciding whether to enforce a covenant not to
compete. If an employee is terminated without cause, courts are hesitant to enforce
a noncompete under the argument that if the employee really had access to an
appropriable interest of the employer, the employer would not arbitrarily discharge
the employee. 90 Presumably the payment of a significant “garden leave” to the
discharged employee during the period of the noncompete might convince a court
that the employer did have a legitimate protectable interest. 91 Recent Washington
and Massachusetts statues specify that such noncompetes are unenforceable if the
employee is laid-off or discharged without cause.92 On a related note, if the employee
leaves because the employer commits a material breach of the employment contract,
for example not paying the employee, American courts will generally not enforce an
otherwise binding noncompete.93 However, in such cases the result is more often an
application of the “clean hands doctrine” than an assessment as to whether the
employer has a legitimate protectable interest.94 A contrary result would leave the
employee economically vulnerable to his or her tormentor.

F. Considering the Competing Interests of the Employee and the Public
Even if the employer has a legitimate interest and the covenant is reasonable in
duration and scope, a court may not enforce the noncompete if it imposes undue
hardship on the employee or is injurious to the public. 95 In considering these
competing interests, the courts and state legislatures have shown much more concern
for the public’s interest than they have for the burden on employees.

89. See infra note 172 and accompanying text.
90. Wrigg, 362 Mont, infra note 316, at 507. (absent evidence the employee appropriated trade
secrets, it is difficult to establish a legitimate business interest for enforcement of a noncompete when the
employer initiates the termination without cause); Arakelian v. Omnicare Inc. 735 F. Supp. 2d 22, 41
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[e]nforcing a [noncompete] when the employee has been discharged without cause
would be ‘unconscionable’ because it would destroy mutuality of obligation”).
91. See Charles A. Sullivan, Tending the Garden: Restricting Competition Via “Garden Leave”, 37
BERKELY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 293 (2016); Greg T. Lembrich, Garden Leave: A Possible Solution to the
Uncertain Enforceability of Restrictive Employment Covenants, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2291 (2001).
92. WA ST 49.44.190; Mass. Gen. Laws c. 149, §24L.
93. See, e.g., Licocci v. Cardinal Assocs., Inc., 492 N.E.2d 48, 52 (Ind. App. 1986) (In the context
of noncompetes, “[a] party first guilty of a material breach of contract may not maintain an action against
the other party . . . should that party subsequently breach the contract.”); Francorp, Inc. v. Siebert, 126 F.
Supp. 2d 543, 547 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
94. Id.
95. See Blake, supra note 27, at 648–49 citing Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 94, 144 (1955); see also, supra
note 44; 820 I.L.C.S. §§90/1-90/10; ME. REV. STAT. Ti. 26, c. 7, §599-A; MD. CODE, LAB. & EMPL. § 3716; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 103.465.
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Although the consideration of “undue hardship” on the employee is accepted
in many jurisdictions, it is rarely the basis on which a noncompete is voided.96 More
often “undue hardship” is mentioned in conjunction with some other failure of the
covenant to meet the common law test, for example if the employer has failed to
show a legitimate protectable interest97 or when the employee has been fired without
cause.98 Indeed, Florida has expressly legislated that courts should not take employee
hardship into account in evaluating whether to enforce a noncompete. 99 However,
some states have recently reaffirmed this consideration in statutes governing
noncompetes.100 Factors that courts have cited in looking for “undue hardship” on
the employee include whether the covenant bars the employee’s sole means of
support, whether the covenant stifles the employee’s inherent skill and experience,
the proportionality of benefit to employer and detriment to employee, and the need
for the employee to change his calling or residence.101
Conversely, although certainly not the typical case, it is not hard to find cases
in which a noncompete is invalidated because it frustrates the “public interest,” even
though the covenant satisfies the other common law requirements. 102 The public
interest is most often successfully invoked to void a noncompete where a very small
number of persons or firms provide an important good or service to a distinct market,
for example a doctor providing medical services in a small town or rural area.103
Indeed, some courts subject restrictive covenants affecting healthcare professionals
to a higher degree of scrutiny based on public interest. 104 Moreover, eleven states
and the District of Columbia have statutes specifically limiting or voiding
noncompetes for physicians.105 Another sixteen states and the District of Columbia
96. See, e.g., Marcam Corp. v. Orchard, 885 F. Supp. 294, 298 (D. Mass. 1995) (holding that a
noncompetition covenant covering the entire United States did not work an undue burden on the employee
because he could move to London or work in the United States for a noncompetitor); see also, Beck, supra
note 69. (States with statutes or cases discussing undue hardship include Illinois, Kentucky, Maine,
Maryland, Minnesota, Nevada, Tennessee, West Virginia, etc.).
97. See, e.g., Chavers, 519 So., supra note 64, at 945 (holding that a covenant unnecessary to protect
any legitimate interest also worked an “undue hardship”).
98. MacIntosh v. Brunswick Corp., 215 A.2d 222, 225–226 (Md. 1965) (holding that restrictive
covenant imposed “undue hardship” on employee in part because employee was fired “through no fault
of his own.”).
99. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 542.335(g)(1). See, e.g., N. Am. Products Corp. v. Moore, 196 F. Supp.2d
1217, 1231 (M.D. Fla. 2002) (holding that the district court was precluded from considering potential
economic hardship faced by an ex-employee when determining whether to grant a preliminary
injunction.).
100. See e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.195–200; RSA 275:70, 275:70-a; R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 28-59-13.
101. See Beck, supra note 69 (Alaska and Nebraska).
102. See, e.g., Odess v. Taylor, 211 So. 2d 805, 810-812 (Ala. 1968); Cmty. Hosp. Grp., Inc. v. More,
869 A.2d 884, 900 (N.J. 2005).
103. See, e.g., Odess v. Taylor, 211 So. 2d 805, 810–812 (Ala. 1968) (interpreting state statute to
prohibit restrictive covenants among medical professionals).
104. See, e.g., Sammarco v. Anthem Ins. Cos., Inc., 723 N.E.2d 128, 132 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998),
overruled on other grounds, 839 N.E.2d 49, 54 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (“[R]estrictive covenants that . . .
limit a physician’s ability to practice medicine . . . are scrutinized more carefully than similar covenants
restricting other types of employment.”).
105. Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Rhode
Island, Tennessee, Texas and West Virginia. See Schwab, supra note 25 at Appendix Table A-2.
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have restrictions on covenants not to compete for other professions, most notably
broadcasters. 106 The American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional
Conduct prohibit noncompetes for attorneys, and this rule has been successfully
adopted in all states. 107 The American Bar Association’s prohibition on lawyer
noncompete agreements is intended to protect attorneys’ “professional autonomy”
and “the freedom of clients” to select counsel of their choice.108

G. Severability and the Possible Reform of Unreasonable Constraints:
Blue Pencils, Red Pencils, and Equitable Reform
The general contract doctrine of severance has had important consequences in
the field of employee restraints since the inception of the rule of reason. In the first
employee case after Mitchel v. Reynolds, the court enforced the covenant only after
applying a “blue pencil” to strike a portion of the restraint which was unreasonably
broad in geographic area.109 Under the doctrine of severability, if a contract contains
both enforceable and unenforceable promises, the court can sever the unenforceable
promises, as long as they are not “essential,” and enforce the remaining valid
provisions.110 A promise is considered “essential” if the parties would not have made
the contract without it. 111 In severing the non-essential unenforceable terms, the
court wields the emblematic “blue pencil.” 112 Parties sometimes include
“severability clauses” in a contract to specify that certain clauses are “essential” or
to try to influence the process of severance, but generally courts make their own
determination on these issues.113 The purpose of the doctrine is to allow the parties
to salvage enforceable promises rather than void the entire contract over lack of legal
sophistication and honest mistakes. Severance is unavailable if the “circumstances

106. The states limiting or voiding noncompetes on broadcasters include: Arizona, Connecticut,
Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, New York, Oregon, Utah and Washington. See Schwab, supra note 25 at
Appendix Table A-3. Other exempted professions include: “professionals” (Alabama), medical, veterinary
and social workers (Arkansas), technology workers (Hawaii), government contractors (Illinois),
accountants (Louisiana), nurses, social workers and psychologists (Massachusetts), secretaries and clerks
(Missouri), in-house counsel and psychologists (New Jersey), health professionals (New Mexico), home
healthcare workers (Oregon), beauticians and cosmetologists (Vermont). Beck Reed Riden, 50 State
Noncompete Chart (6/27/21) https://beckreedriden.com/50-state-noncompete-chart-2/.
107. The American Bar Association Model Rule of Professional Conduct 5.6 prohibits a lawyer from
making “a partnership, shareholders, operating, employment, or other similar type of agreement that
restricts the right of a lawyer to practice after termination of the relationship . . .” See also, American Bar
Association Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Obligations Related to Notice
When Lawyers Change Firms, Formal Opinion 489 (2019) (“ethics rules do not allow non-competition
clauses in partnership, member, shareholder, or employment agreements” among attorneys).
108. Id.
109. Chesman v. Nainby, 2 Str. 739, 93 Eng. Rep. 819 (K.B. 1726).
110. Mark L. Movsesian, Severability in Statutes and Contracts, 30 GA. L. REV. 41, 47–48 (1995);
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 184 (Am. L. Inst. 1981).
111. Toledo Police Patrolmen’s Ass’n, Local 10 v. City of Toledo, 641 N.E.2d 799, 803 (Ohio Ct.
App.), appeal denied, 639 N.E.2d 795 (Ohio 1994).
112. Movsesian supra note 110, at 47–48.
113. Id.
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indicate bad faith or deliberate overreaching” in negotiating the unenforceable
provisions.114
With respect to employee covenants not to compete, there are three basic
approaches that states use to apply the severability doctrine to deal with unreasonably
broad restraints. First, nine states115 apply the strictest form of the “blue pencil rule”
and their courts will enforce the reasonable terms in a noncompete provided the
covenant remains grammatically coherent once its unreasonable provisions are
excised.116 The court cannot revise, rearrange, or add language to the agreement; it
can use its blue pencil merely to strike words in the contract.117 Second, thirty-three
states and the District of Columbia118 apply a more liberal version of the blue pencil
rule, usually referred to as “equitable reformation,” in which the court is allowed to
amend the language in question to generate an enforceable contract consistent with
the intent of the parties. 119 Equitable reformation allows both the deletion and
addition of words to the contract, and increases the chances that the employee will
be subject to an enforceable noncompete.120 Finally, three states121 have rejected the
blue pencil rule and adopted what is known as the “red pencil rule” in which their
courts will strike down the entire noncompete if any of its constraints are
unreasonable.122 No reformation of an unreasonable noncompete is possible in these
jurisdictions.

114. Ferrofluidics Corp. v. Advanced Vacuum Components, Inc., 968 F.2d 1463, 1469 (1st Cir. 1992)
(citing Durapin, Inc. v. Am. Prods. Inc., 559 A.2d 1051, 1058 (R.I. 1989)).
115. Arizona, Connecticut, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Montana, North Carolina, and
South Carolina. See Beck, supra note 69.
116. Griffin Toronjo Pivateau, Putting the Blue Pencil Down: An Argument for Specificity in NonCompete Agreements, 86 NEB. L. REV. 672, 682 (2008).
117. See for example, Valley Medical Specialists v. Farber, 982 P.2d 1277, 1286 (Ariz. 1999) (courts
can modify unreasonable noncompetes only if the unreasonable provisions are grammatically severable);
Hahn v. Dress, Perugini & Co., 581 N.E.2d 457, 462 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (a court may modify a restrictive
covenant by redacting unreasonable terms but not by adding additional terms).
118. Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. See Beck, supra note 69.
119. Some states specify this approach by statute. See MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 445.774a (West
1989) (‘‘To the extent any such agreement or covenant is found to be unreasonable in any respect, a court
may limit the agreement to render it reasonable in light of the circumstances in which it was made and
specifically enforce the agreement as limited.”); Other states have adopted this approach through case law.
See Data Mgmt., Inc. v. Greene, 757 P.2d 62, 64–65 (Alaska 1988) (permitting reasonable alterations to
an overbroad covenant drafted in good faith).
120. North Am. Paper Co. v. Unterberger, 526 N.E.2d 621, 625 (Ill. Ct. App. 1988) (Illinois courts
may employ principles of equity in modifying overbroad noncompetes if considerations of fairness weigh
in favor of modification); Phone Connection v. Harbst, 494 N.W.2d 445, 449–450 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992)
(Iowa courts have the power to modify the content of an overly broad nonompete.
121. Nebraska, Virginia, and Wisconsin. In addition, two states, New Mexico and Utah, have not yet
decided the question, and three states, California, North Dakota and Oklahoma, do not enforce
employment noncompetes. See Beck, supra note 69.
122. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 103.465 (West 1988) (“[A)ny covenant, described in this subsection,
imposing an unreasonable restraint is illegal, void and unenforceable even as to any part of the covenant
or performance that would be a reasonable restraint.”). Pitchford v. Oakwood Mobile Homes, 124 F. Supp.
2d 958, 965 (W.D. Va. 2000) (reiterating that Virginia courts refuse to adopt any version of the blue pencil
doctrine to avoid rewriting the contract on behalf of the parties).
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The debate between the blue pencil and red pencil approaches turns on concerns
over the equitable enforcement of noncompetes and the preclusive effects of overbroad noncompetes. Proponents of the blue pencil argue that it is unfair to strike
down a noncompete due to overbreadth issues that don’t apply to the case in question,
particularly if the employer clearly has protectable interests with the covered
employee.123 Proponents of the slashing red pencil argue that without it, employers
don’t have adequate incentive to narrowly draft noncompetes and employees will
feel bound by a spurious agreement and pass on valuable opportunities that would
benefit the worker and society at large. 124 As will be discussed later, despite the
common law doctrine that severance should not be available in cases of bad-faith or
deliberate over-reaching, clearly overbroad and unenforceable noncompetes are
proliferating in both blue and red pencil states with a negative impact on workers and
the economy.125

III. THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE WITH COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE:
THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THEIR IMPACT ON WORKERS, FIRMS, AND
THE VIBRANCY OF THE ECONOMY
As previously mentioned, economic theory provides both positive and negative
accounts of the efficiency of employee noncompetes. Under the positive account,
noncompetes allow employers to make investments in potentially appropriable
technology, customer contacts and employee reputation to the benefit of the
employer, employee and society. Under the negative account, noncompetes allow
employers to extend monopsony power and raise potential competitor’s costs for
their own benefit, but to the detriment of employees and society. Fortunately, these
competing theories yield different predictions that can be tested empirically to
determine whether and under what circumstances each account holds true.

A. The Economics of Noncompetes: Mitigating Holdup or
Accentuating Employer Market Power?
The positive economic theory of noncompetes is that they allow the employer
to make investments in intangible assets that otherwise might not be made because
the value of the investments could be appropriated if the employee leaves and works
for a competitor. 126 In the economic literature this is known as a “holdup problem”
123. Blake, supra note 27 at 682.
124. Blake, supra note 27. “If severance is generally applied, employers can fashion truly ominous
covenants with confidence that they will be pared down and enforced when the facts of a particular case
are not unreasonable.” Pivateau, supra note 116; Charles Sullivan, The Puzzling Persistence of
Unenforceable Contract Terms, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 1127, 1162 (2009).
125. See infra note 145 and accompanying text. In 2016, the U.S. Treasury issued a report declaring
that the overuse of restrictive covenants was harming the American economy. See Office of Economic
Policy U.S. Department of the Treasury, Non-compete Contracts: Economic Effects and Policy
Implications (March 2016).
126. See McAdams 2019, supra note 9, at 6; Rubin & Shedd, supra note 5; Starr, Prescott & Bishara
(2021), supra note 5, at 7 in draft.
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in that the threat that the employee will leave and appropriate the value of the
investment prevents the employer from making the investment. 127 Common
examples of employer investments that might be subject to this holdup problem
include investments in trade secrets, customer lists, customer relations and employee
reputation. 128 The employer investment, combined with the employee’s labor,
produces a positive rent over which the employer and employee can bargain.129 The
employee will agree to future constraints on his or her job search if the employer
shares a portion of the rent with the employee and raises his or her wage. 130 Thus,
this account of noncompetes predicts that such clauses should increase employee
wages, decrease worker mobility, increase employer investment and profits, and
increase innovation and total wealth and welfare.131
The negative economic theory of noncompetes is that employers use
advantages in bargaining power to compel the employee to accept restrictions on his
or her future employment which extend employer monopsony power in the labor
market and raise the costs of competitors in the product market.132 Under this theory,
noncompetes benefit employers, but not employees or society, because they allow
the employer to augment existing monopsony power, or take advantage of a shortterm advantage to extend their monopsony power and constrain wages.133 Employer
monopsony power is associated with job search costs, 134 and covenants not to
compete increase employee job search costs.135 Noncompetes that are imposed on
the employee after he or she has already accepted the job and foregone alternatives
can be used by the employer to extend a short-run advantage in bargaining power
into a long-term constraint on employee mobility.136 Noncompetes may also yield
the employer advantages in the product market because they raise the recruiting costs
of potential competitors, including the bound employee. 137 The concern that
noncompetes may augment employer monopsony power has become more acute as
127. See Rubin & Shedd, supra note 5; Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits
of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691 (1986).
128. McAdams 2019, supra note 9, at 6.
129. Pierre Cahuc, Fabien Postel-Vinay & Jean-Mark Robin, Wage Bargaining with On-the-Job
Search: Theory and Evidence, 74 ECONOMETRICA 323 (2006).
130. McAdams 2019, supra note 9, at 6. The reduction in turnover attendant to the use of noncompetes
might also yield a rent the employer and employee could share, but this theoretical possibility seems of
little relevance to the real world of noncompetes.
131. Id.
132. See McAdams 2019, supra note 9, at 5; Starr, Prescott & Bishara (2021), supra note 5, at 6–7 in
draft.
133. Starr, Prescott & Bishara (2021), supra note 5, at 2, 7 in draft.
134. Kenneth Burdett & Dale T. Mortensen, Wage Differentials, Employer Size, and Unemployment,
39 INT’L ECON. REV. 257 (1998); Manning, supra note 8.
135. Starr, Prescott & Bishara (2021), supra note 5, at 7.
136. Starr, Prescott & Bishara (2021), supra note 5, at 2, 7; Natarajan Balasubramanian et al., Locked
In? The Enforceability of Covenants Not to Compete and the Careers of High-Tech Workers, 57 JOURNAL
OF HUMAN RESOURCES (2022); Suresh Naidu, Eric A. Posner, & Glen Weyl, Antitrust Remedies for Labor
Market Power, 132 HARV L REV 536, 595 (2018); see also Krueger & Posner, supra note 20.
137. Notice that because each employer raises his competitors’ recruitment costs, this aspect of
noncompetes becomes a positional externality that just raises costs and wastes resources. On positional
externalities see Robert H. Frank, Positional Externalities, STRATEGY AND CHOICE: ESSAYS IN HONOR
OF THOMAS C. SCHELLING 25–47 (Richard Zeckhauser, ed., 1991).
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the practice of employer “no-poaching” agreements has become more common138
and concerns about employer labor market monopsony power have increased. 139
Thus, under the account of noncompetes as extensions of monopsony power,
economic theory predicts that noncompetes will lower employee wages, decrease
employee turnover, increase employer profits, perhaps increase product prices, and
decrease innovation and total wealth and welfare.140
Recently a number of scholars have undertaken empirical studies to measure
the prevalence of noncompetes among American workers and to examine the impact
of these agreements on those workers, their firms and the U.S. economy. 141 To
examine these questions, researchers have conducted employee and business
surveys 142 and used a variety of empirical strategies. 143 In comparing outcomes
across states, researchers sometimes employ an index of relative “enforceability” for
each state, based on the state’s legal doctrine and how readily courts enforce
noncompetes in that state.144
138. Naidu et al., supra note 21, at 545; Posner, supra note 20; Krueger & Posner, supra note 20.
139. Anna Sokolova & Todd Sorensen, Monopsony in Labor Markets: A Meta-Analysis, 74
WASHINGTON CENTER FOR EQUITABLE GROWTH 27 (2020); David Card, Who Set Your Wage?, 112 AM.
ECON. REV. 1075 (2022); Manning, supra note 8; Krueger & Posner supra note 20. Even if noncompetes
yield benefits to both the contracting employers and employees, concern has grown in the literature that
noncompetes might decrease societal wealth because they quell innovation, competition, and growth.
Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: Sillicon Valley, Route
128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U L. REV. 575 (1999); ALAN HYDE, WORKING IN SILICON
VALLEY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF A HIGH VELOCITY LABOR MARKET (2003); Kenneth G.
Dau-Schmidt, High Velocity Labor Economics: A Review Essay of Working in Silicon Valley: Economic
and Legal Analysis of a High-Velocity Labor Market, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 847 (2004).
140. Starr, Prescott & Bishara (2021), supra note 5 at 2, 7.
141. There are two very useful reviews of the empirical literature in this area to which our work on
this project is deeply indebted. McAdams 2019, supra note 9; Evan Starr, The Use, Abuse, and
Enforceability of Non-Compete and No-Poach Agreements: A Brief Review of the Theory, Evidence, and
Recent Reform Efforts, Econ. Innovation Group 2 (Feb. 2019), available at https://eig.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/02/Non-Competes-Brief.pdf.
142. See, e.g., Starr, Prescott & Bishara (2021), supra note 5; Colvin & Shierholz, supra note 13;
Mark J. Garmaise, Ties that Truly Bind: Noncompetition Agreements, Executive Compensation, and Firm
Investment, 27 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 276 (2009); Omesh Kini, Ryan Williams & David Yin, CEO NonCompete Agreements, Job Risk, and Compensation, THE REV. FINANCIAL STUDIES (2020); Matthew S.
Johnson, & Michael Lipsitz,Why Are Low-Wage Workers Signing Noncompete Agreements?, 57 J.
HUMAN RESOURCES (2022); Kurt Lavetti, Carol Simon, & William D White, The Impacts of Restricting
Mobility of Skilled Workers: Evidence from Physicians, 55 J. HUMAN RESOURCES (2020).
143. There are three general approaches used to assess the effects of noncompete agreements. The
first is to examine the impact of changes in state policy on noncompete enforceability, for example if a
state changes to prohibit their enforcement. The second evaluates the impact of having a high incidence
of noncompete agreements in a state with high enforceability in a difference-in-differences (or triple
differences) framework. The third compares labor market outcomes of signers with non-signers after
controlling for other worker characteristics through regression analysis. McAdams 2019, supra note 9, at
10-11.
144. In determining the relative magnitude of “enforceability” in a state, researchers commonly look
at a number of legal doctrines including: whether noncompetes can be enforced for both voluntary and
involuntary separations; whether employers must provide additional consideration beyond continuing
employment; the state’s standard for sufficient “protectable interest” to motivate a noncompete; and
whether the state is a blue pencil, red pencil or equitable reform state. Some researchers use a sophisticated
weighted multi-factor analysis to compute a meaningful index from these criteria. Typically, Florida,
Connecticut, Kansas, Missouri, South Dakota, and Iowa rank the highest on these enforceability indexes,
while Oklahoma, Arkansas, New York, California, and North Dakota rank the lowest. See JJ Prescott,
Norman Bishara, & Evan Starr, Understanding Non-competition Agreements-The 2014 Noncompete
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B. The Incidence, Distribution, and Circumstances of Noncompetes
The incidence of employee noncompetes in the United States has grown from
relative insignificance to about 20–25% of the American labor force. In a 2014
nationwide survey of 11,505 workers, Starr, Prescott, and Bishara found that 18.1%
of labor force participants reported being bound by a noncompete, and that 38% had
been covered by one in the past. 145 This percentage climbs to 19.9% when an
estimate of the share of workers who don’t know whether they are covered by a
noncompete, but in fact are, is included. 146 Less comprehensive surveys have
produced similar estimates. In a 2017 survey of 795 employees, Krueger and Posner
found that 15.5% of employees reported being covered by a noncompete147 while in
another 2017 survey of 2,000 Utah employees, Cicero found that 18% of employees
reported being covered by a noncompete.148
As useful as they are, surveys of individual workers may produce an underestimate of the prevalence of noncompetes in the workforce because these same
surveys show that the workers do not always know whether they are bound by a
noncompete. 149 To solve this problem, Colvin and Shierholz conducted a 2017
survey of 634 American business establishments to find out how many used
covenants not to compete and then extrapolated from this finding to an estimate of
the percent of the American workforce that is covered by such agreements. 150 They
found that 49.4%, of responding establishments indicated that at least some of their
employees were required to enter into a noncompete agreement and 31.8%, of
responding establishments indicated that all of their employees were required to
enter into a noncompete agreement, regardless of pay or job duties.151 These findings
translated into an estimate that between 27.8% and 46.5% of private-sector workers
in the United States are subject to noncompetes, or between 36 million and 60 million
workers.152
Noncompete clauses are not distributed evenly across the American work force.
In their 2014 survey, Starr, Prescott, and Bishara found that, noncompetes are more
common among salaried workers (27.5%), workers who make more than
$40,000/year (25.2%), those with a graduate degree (30.0%), and those employed by
Survey Project, 2 MICH. ST. L. REV. 369, 457–59 (2016); Balasubramanian, et al, Locked In? The
Enforceability of Covenants Not to Compete and the Careers of High-Tech Workers, U.S. Census Bureau,
Center for Economic Studies Paper #CES-WP-17-09 (2018); Evan Starr, Consider This—Firm-Sponsored
Training and the Enforceability of Covenants Not to Compete, 72(4) IND LAB REL REV 783 (2019).
145. Starr, Prescott & Bishara (2021), supra note 5.
146. Id. at note 16.
147. Krueger & Posner, supra note 20, at 7–8.
148. Cicero, Utah Noncompete Agreement Research (2017), http://issuu.com/saltlakechamber
/docs/utah_noncompete_agreement_research. See also, Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt & Timothy A. Haley,
Governance of the Workplace: The Contemporary Regime of Individual Contract, 28 COMP. LAB. L. &
POL. J. 313, Tables 1 and 2 (2007) (individual employment contracts are much more likely to contain
noncompetes than collective bargaining agreements).
149. Starr, Prescott & Bishara (2021), supra note 5.
150. Colvin & Shierholz, supra note 13.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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firms with more than 5,000 employees (21.5%). 153 They also found that
noncompetes were more common in some occupations, notably architecture and
engineering (36%), computing and mathematics (35%) and management (30%), 154
and some industries, notably information (32%), mining and extraction (31%), and
professional and scientific services (31%). 155 Surveys of engineers employed in
technology firms 156 and primary care physicians 157 confirm that these high skill
workers are more likely to be subject to a covenant not to compete (32.6% and 45%,
respectively). In a 2006 study of 375 contracts for CEOs of major corporations,
Schwab and Thomas found that 67.5% of the contracts contained covenants not to
compete.158 In their 2017 survey of business establishments, Colvin and Shierholz
found that 52.0% of firms in the business services industry imposed noncompetes on
all of their employees.159 Consistent with legal theory, Starr, Prescott, and Bishara
found that covenants not to compete were more common among employees who had
access to sensitive information, especially trade secrets (32.6%). 160 Based on their
regression analysis of the independent association of various characteristics with the
likelihood that an employee will have a noncompete, Starr, Prescott, and Bishara
estimate that a salaried employee, in a private for profit firm, earning $100,000 per
year, who has a college degree, and who has access to employer trade secrets, has a
44% likelihood of being bound by a noncompete.161

153. Starr, Prescott & Bishara (2021), supra note 5, Table 5 (reproduced in the appendix).
154. Starr, Prescott & Bishara (2021), supra note 5, Figure 5.
155. Starr, Prescott & Bishara (2021), supra note 5, Table 5 (reproduced in the appendix).
156. Matt Marx The Firm Strikes Back: Non-Compete Agreements and the Mobility of Technical
Professionals, 76 AMER. SOC. REV. 695 (2011).
157. See Lavetti, Simon & White (2018), supra note 142.
158. See Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of CEO Employment
Contracts: What Do Top Executives Bargain For?, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 231 (2006). On noncompetes
in CEO employment contracts, see also, Marx, supra note 161; Garmaise, supra note 142; Kini et al.,
supra note 142.
159. Colvin & Shierholz, supra note 13, at Table 3, p. 7.
160. Starr, Prescott & Bishara (2021), supra note 5, Table 5 (reproduced in the appendix).
161. Id. at p. 8.
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However, Starr, Prescott, and Bishara found that noncompetes are also common
among low paid employees in less sensitive positions who are unlikely to have access
to appropriable information. These workers include hourly employees (14.0%), those
who make less than $40,000 per year (13.3%), those without a college degree
(14.3%), those employed by firms with less than twenty-five employees (11.6%) and
even those who profess no access to sensitive information (7.8%).162 They found
noncompetes even among grounds maintenance employees (11%) and food
preparers and servers (11%).163 Colvin and Shierholz found that even in the leisure
and hospitality industry, 14.3% of business establishments impose noncompetes on
all of their employees.164 Even though noncompetes are found disproportionately
among high paid salaried employees, because low-wage hourly employees are so
much more numerous, the majority of employees with noncompetes are hourly
employees (53%). 165 Colvin and Shierholz found that among business
establishments where the average employee wage was less than $13.00 per hour,
29.0% of responding firms imposed noncompetes on all their workers. 166 Based on
their regression analysis, Starr, Prescott, and Bishara estimate that an hourly

162. Id.
163. Starr, Prescott & Bishara (2021), supra note 5, Figure 5.
164. Colvin & Shierholz, supra note 13, at Table 3, p. 7.
165. Michael Lipsitz & Evan Starr, Low-Wage Workers and the Enforceability of Non-Compete
Agreements, 1 MANAGEMENT SCIENCE (2020).
166. Colvin & Shierholz, supra note 13, at p. 7.
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employee, in a private for profit firm, earning $50,000 per year, who does not have
a college degree, and who does not have access to employer trade secrets, has a 13%
chance of being covered by a noncompete.167

From the perspective of legal scholars, Starr, Prescott, and Bishara also quite
usefully explored the circumstances under which covenants not to compete are
imposed on workers by their employers. They found that 29.3% of employees with
a noncompete clause first learned of the clause only after they had accepted the job,
while 63.0% first learned of the clause before acceptance and 7.7% couldn’t
remember when they first learned of the clause. 168 When presented with a
noncompete, only 10% of employees report negotiating over the clause, while 88%
report just reading and signing it with 6.7% admitting that they did not even read the
provision.169 The top reasons for forgoing the opportunity to negotiate include that
the terms were reasonable (52%), the assumption that noncompetes were not
negotiable (41%) and the fear of being fired (20%) or creating tension with their
employer (19%).170 Only 8% responded that they did not negotiate because they
assumed the employer would not sue and only 7% responded that they did not
negotiate because they did not think a court would enforce the provision. 171

167. Id., at p. 8.
168. Starr, Prescott & Bishara (2021), supra note 5, Table 7. In this result we combine those who say
they first learned of the noncompete before they accepted the job (60.8%), with those who say they first
learned before accepting a promotion or raise (2.2%).
169. Id.
170. Id. Table OB2, at 42 in draft.
171. Id.
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Advance notice of the noncompete appears to matter to employees since those
who receive advance notice are almost twice as likely to bargain for benefits in
exchange for the noncompete (11.6%) in comparison with those without advance
notice (6%).172 Of those who did not receive advance notice of the noncompete, 26%
report that they would have reconsidered accepting the job if they had known about
the restriction. 173 Consultation with friends, family, or a lawyer is relatively
uncommon among those presented with a noncompete (17%), but those who seek
advice are three to five times more likely to negotiate for benefits in return for the
restriction.174
Finally, quite surprisingly, it seems that noncompete clauses are almost as
common in states where the clauses are unenforceable as they are in states where
they are readily enforceable. Starr, Prescott, and Bishara found no significant
difference in the percent of employees ostensibly covered by noncompetes in
California and North Dakota (19%), where they are unenforceable, and the percent
covered in the rest of the country, and even in states such as Florida and Connecticut
(19%) where the clauses are readily unenforceable. 175 Performing a multivariate
analysis to separate out the impact of other variables, for example the fact that
California is a high tech state with a lot of employees who have access to employer
trade secrets, Starr, Prescott, and Bishara find that the percent of employees subject
to noncompetes in states where they are unenforceable is about four to five
percentiles less than what would be expected in a state where they are enforceable.176
In their survey of business establishments, Colvin and Shierholz found that the
percent of establishments that required all of their employees to submit to
noncompetes was not significantly different in California (29.3%) from the
percentages calculated in eleven other states, including Florida (39.3%).177

C. The Impact of Noncompetes on Workers’ Wages
Empirical studies of the impact of noncompete agreements on the labor market
have examined a number of outcomes, in particular the impact of such agreements
on worker wages and mobility. The impact of these agreements on worker wages are
of particular importance because the positive and negative economic models of the
impact of noncompetes yield very different predictions with respect to this variable:
if noncompetes are voluntary agreements that facilitate employer investments that
make workers more productive, the workers should receive compensating wages for
accepting the post-employment constraint; however, if noncompetes facilitate and
extend employer monopsony power, the workers should suffer a diminution in wages

172. Id. Table 7, at 34 in draft.
173. Id.
174. Id. Among those workers who consult with friends and family, 30.8% try to negotiate, and among
those workers who consult with a lawyer, 48.6% try to negotiate.
175. Id. at 7 in draft.
176. Id.
177. Colvin & Shierholz, supra note 13, Table 2, at p. 6.
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with the imposition of a noncompete. Both the positive and negative economic
models predict that noncompetes will result in lower worker mobility, but it is still
useful to estimate the magnitude of this impact in order to evaluate whether
noncompetes are beneficial or detrimental to the larger economy.
The empirical studies to date suggest that employees generally suffer a decrease
in wages with the imposition of a noncompete, although high wage, high skill,
employees may enjoy higher wages, particularly if they have advance notice of the
noncompete and an opportunity to bargain over the terms of its acceptance. Studies
that compare wages across states with different levels of enforcement of
noncompetes have found that increased enforcement of noncompetes results in lower
wages for workers. Starr, Prescott, and Bishara find that moving from a nonenforcement regime to an average enforcement regime lowers wages in a state by
4%. 178 The Treasury Department has combined the Starr, Prescott, and Bishara
findings with demographic data from the Current Population Survey to produce
estimates of the impact of noncompete enforcement on average hourly wages over
the life cycle, reproduced in Chart 3. These estimates suggest that, as workers age,
the average wage benefit of being free from noncompetes increases from a mere
2.14% when the worker is twenty years old, to 11.5% when the worker is fifty years
old. Using a method of analysis similar to that used by Starr, Prescott, and Bishara,
Balasubramanian et al. found that tech workers receive wages that are 2.0–2.8%
lower on average in states with an average level of enforcement of noncompetes as
compared with workers in non-enforcing states.179

178. Starr, Prescott & Bishara (2021), supra note 5, at 14 and Table 9 in draft; see also, Evan Starr,
Consider This . . , supra note 144, at 785 (2019).
179. Balasubramanian et al., supra note 136.
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The results of studies that examine changes in the enforcement of noncompetes
within a given state concur. Lipsitz and Starr estimate that Oregon’s partial ban on
noncompetes in 2008 led to a 2.2 to 3.1% increase in average wages for low wage
hourly workers relative to several control groups. 180 Johnson, Lavetti and Lipsitz
estimate that the wages of U.S. workers would increase 7% on average if
noncompetes were made unenforceable nationwide. 181 However, the results of
studies comparing workers with and without covenants give more mixed, but still
reasonable, results. Lavetti, Simon and White find that wage growth among primary
care physicians is higher among those who signed a noncompete compared with
those who have not.182 Starr et al. (2019) find that workers bound by noncompetes
earn 7% higher wages compared with comparable unbound workers, however the
circumstances of adoption of the noncompete seem to matter since those workers
receiving advance notice of the noncompete receive 10% higher wages, while those
receiving notice after accepting the job receive no wage premium.183

180. Lipsitz & Starr, supra note 168.
181. Mathew S. Johnson, Kurt Lavetti & Michael Lipsitz, The Labor Market Effects of Legal
Restrictions on Worker Mobility, at 12 (Sept. 22, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (herein after “Johnson
et al. (2019)).
182. See Lavetti, Simon & White (2018), supra note 142.
183. Starr, Prescott & Bishara (2021), supra note 5 at 12 in draft.
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C. The Impact of Noncompetes on Firms’ Investment
Under the positive economic theory of noncompetes, the clauses allow firms to
make investments in non-tangible assets which they otherwise would not make
because the value of these assets is appropriable if the employee leaves. Accordingly,
if noncompetes perform this function, we should see increased employer investment
in these non-tangible assets in jurisdictions that allow their enforcement.184 The most
common investments examined in the empirical literature are “shared information,”
customer lists, and employee training.
Although there is some variation in the findings, depending on the type of
noncompete and occupation, the scholars who have looked at this question have
largely found that workers who are covered by a noncompete receive greater access
to information, customer lists, and training, than other similarly situated workers who
are not covered by a noncompete.185 Starr, Prescott, and Bishara found that workers
covered by noncompetes were 7.8% more likely to received shared information and
11% more likely to have received training in the last year than workers without a
noncompete, but only if the noncompete was raised with the employee in advance of
acceptance of the offer of employment. 186 Accordingly, one might view the
employer’s decision whether to raise the issue in advance of employment as a marker
for whether the employer has a legitimate protectable interest. Lavetti, Simon and
White found that physicians receive more intra-practice patient referrals, or
“customer contacts,” when they have a signed noncompete agreement. 187 Starr
estimates that moving a state from a non-enforcement regime to an average
enforcement regime would increase the incidence of worker training by 18%. 188
Johnson and Lipsitz find that, among coiffures, coverage by a noncompete is
associated with a 14% greater likelihood of the firm providing on-the-job training.189
As the contrarian, Garmaise suggests that noncompetes may increase firm-sponsored
training, but decrease employee investments in training, and thus the predicted
impact of noncompetes on training is indeterminant. 190 Examining the impact of
changes in state law in Florida, Louisiana, and Texas on top executives of public
companies, he finds that the decline in self-sponsored general training associated
with a noncompete is greater than the increase in employer sponsored general
training, leading to lower levels of overall human capital investment among these
employees.191

184. But see, Garmaise, supra note 142, arguing that noncompetes have potentially offsetting effects
on investments in training: they increase the incentive for firm-sponsored training but decrease that of
self-sponsored training.
185. McAdams 2019, supra note 9, at 13–14.
186. Starr, Prescott & Bishara (2021), supra note 5, at 75.
187. Lavetti, Simon & White (2018), supra note 142.
188. Starr, Consider This . . . ., supra note 144, at Table 3.
189. Johnson & Lipsitz, supra note 142.
190. Garmaise, supra note 142.
191. Id.
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D. The Impact of Noncompetes on the Vibrancy of the Economy:
Employee Mobility, In Terrorem Effects, and Firm Entry
Finally, there is the question of the impact of noncompetes on the vibrancy of
the economy. By restricting past employees from becoming competitors or working
for competitors, covenants not to compete raise competitors’ costs, reducing
competition in the economy and perhaps growth and innovation. 192 Raising rivals’
costs is a well-recognized strategy for attaining or maintaining market power which
causes dead-weight losses to society. 193 Younge and Marx have found that the
enforcement of noncompetes increases incumbent firm value, 194 while Younge,
Tong, and Fleming show that firms in states that enforce noncompetes are more
likely to be acquisition targets.195 Of course the wide-spread use of noncompetes will
also raise the employee search costs of incumbent firms. 196 As a result, the
imposition of these costs on rival employers may become merely a positional
externality which imposes a dead-weight loss on the economy without the employer
even attaining a competitive advantage.197 Even if noncompetes do benefit covered
employees and encourage employer investment, they may not be wealth maximizing
if they pose too big of a drag on employee mobility, the formation of firms and
growth of the economy. In his seminal work on the subject, Gilson makes a
convincing argument that triumph of the “Silicon Valley” in success and growth over
possible rivals such as “Route 128” in Massachusetts was in no small part due to the
absence of enforceable noncompetes in California.198 Even though Silicon Valley
employers may have lost some returns on appropriable investments due to employee
mobility, overall the industry and the economy of California benefited. More
recently, Lobel has made a convincing argument concerning the overall negative
effect of noncompetes on the economy.199 Noncompetes may hurt the vibrancy of
the economy through the reduction of employee mobility, the in terrorem effects on
employees who are covered by unenforceable constraints, and by thwarting the
formation and growth of competitors.
192. McAdams 2019, supra note 9; Lobel, supra note 12.
193. Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs
to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986); Timothy J. Brennan, Understanding “Raising
Rivals’ Costs”, 33 ANTITRUST BULL. 95 (1988).
194. Kenneth A. Younge & Matt Marx, The Value of Employee Retention: Evidence from a Natural
Experiment, 25 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 652 (2016). However, Garmaise, supra note 142, finds no
effect on firm value.
195. Kenneth A. Younge, Tony W. Tong & Lee Fleming, How Anticipated Employee Mobility Affects
Acquisition Likelihood: Evidence from a Natural Experiment, 36 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 686 (2015).
196. Noncompetes can impose significant hiring costs on incumbent firms, as demonstrated by the
recent dispute between HP and Cisco over hiring former HP employees. Mark Chandler, HP Sues
Employees for Leaving—We Challenge HP to Support Employee Freedom, CISCO BLOGS (Nov. 23, 2011),
https://blogs.cisco.com/news/hp-sues-employees-for-leaving.
197. On positional externalities, see Frank, supra note 137, at 25–47.
198. Gilson, supra note 139. See also, ALAN HYDE, WORKING IN SILICON VALLEY: ECONOMIC AND
LEGAL ANALYSIS OF A HIGH-VELOCITY LABOR MARKET (2003); Dau-Schmidt, supra note 139.
199. Lobel, supra note 9; Mark A. Lemley & Orly Lobel, Supporting Talent Mobility and Enhancing
Human Capital: Banning Noncompete Agreements to Create Competitive Job Markets, at p. 2–3, Day
One Project (Jan. 2021)
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As previously mentioned, both the positive and negative economic models of
noncompetes predict lower worker mobility and longer job tenure. Not surprisingly,
all of the empirical studies consistently support this prediction. Johnson, Lavetti and
Lipsitz find that moving from a noncompete unenforceability regime to the highest
level of enforceability observed in the United States would reduce the month-tomonth probability of workers changing employers by 26.1%. 200 Similarly, Lipsitz
and Starr show that Oregon’s ban on noncompetes for low wage workers resulted in
an increase in transitions across employers of 12.2–18.3% for those same workers.201
Marx, Strumsky and Fleming found that Michigan’s fortification of the enforcement
of noncompete agreements in the 1980s resulted in an 8.1% decrease in inventors
switching jobs.202 Garmaise found that the shift to stricter enforcement regimes in
Texas, Louisiana and Florida resulted in a 48.5% decrease in the likelihood that top
executives would change jobs within industries, and an increase in their job tenure
of 16%.203 Balasubramanian, et al found that Hawaii’s 2015 ban on noncompetes
among technology workers led to an 11% increase in mobility for those workers,
relative to comparable workers in other states.204 Balasubramanian et al. also found
that, nationwide, workers in states with average enforcement regimes had 8% fewer
jobs than similar workers in non-enforcing states.205 In a forthcoming article, Starr,
Frake and Agarwal find that, in comparing average employee job tenure across states
with different incidences of noncompetes, a 10% increase in the incidence of
noncompetes results in a 0.8 year increase in average job tenure.206 Starr, Frake and
Agarwal also find that, at least in high enforcement states, a high incidence of
noncompetes lowers job offers to both employees covered by noncompetes and those
not covered, suggesting that a high incidence of noncompetes increases friction in
labor mobility generally.207
The widespread existence of clearly unenforceable covenants not to compete
raises the prospect that employers use these clauses to decrease employee mobility
through an in terrorem effect on employee behavior, as a means of decreasing wages
or increasing rivals costs.208 Employees’ behavior may be affected by a noncompete,
even though the clause is clearly not enforceable, either because employees don’t
200. Johnson et al. (2019), supra note 181.
201. Lipsitz & Starr, supra note 15.
202. Matt Marx, Deborah Strumsky & Lee Fleming, Mobility, Skills, and the Michigan Non-Compete
Experiment, 55 MGMT. SCI. 875 (2009).
203. Garmaise, supra note 142.
204. Balasubramanian et al., supra note 136.
205. Id.
206. Evan Starr, Justin Frake & Rajshree Agarwal, Mobility Constraint Externalities, 30 ORG. SCI.
961 (2019).
207. Id. The fact that noncompetes can have “spillover effects” on non-signers complicates empirical
tests of their impact resulting in underestimates when comparing workers who are covered by a
noncompete with those who are not. McAdams 2019, supra note 9, at 11.
208. Blake wrote about the in terrorem effect of covenants not to compete in his 1960 article on the
subject. Blake 1960 at 682-83. See also, Charles A. Sullivan, The Puzzling Persistence of Unenforceable
Contract Terms, 70 OHIO ST. L. J. 1127 (2009). For a more recent treatment of the problem see, Evan
Starr, JJ Prescott & Norman Bishara, The Behavioral Effects of (Unenforceable) Contracts, 36(3) J OF
LAW ECON. & ORGAN. 633 (2020), herein after Starr et al. (2020).
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understand that some clauses aren’t enforceable, 209 or because the employees or
potential employers fear frivolous lawsuits. 210 Starr, Prescott, and Bishara examine
the in terrorem effect of unenforceable noncompetes by comparing the impact of
noncompetes on employee mobility in states where they are enforceable with the
impact they have in states where they are clearly unenforceable. 211 They find that
workers in states where noncompetes are unenforceable suffer a decrease in mobility
that is not significantly different from that suffered by workers in states with an
average level of enforceability.212 Examining the causes of this decrease in mobility,
Starr, Prescott, and Bishara find that workers covered by noncompetes are as likely
to receive job offers from competitors, but they are more likely to turn them down
and focus job search on noncompetitors.213
Finally, there is the question of the impact of noncompetes on the formation
and growth of competitors. The empirical evidence on the impact of noncompetes on
firm startup and entry is mixed, but generally supports the notion that noncompetes
hinder the formation and growth of competitors. Samila and Sorenson study venture
capital availability in response to positive and negative investment shocks in states
with high and low enforcement regimes. 214 They find that states with lower
enforceability of noncompetes respond to such shocks with higher levels of firm
startups and employment.215 These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that
even though noncompetes encourage investments in non-tangible assets, they inhibit
new firm creation more and on net decrease economic growth. Stuart and Sorenson
study initial public offerings and acquisitions in the biotech industry, which they
show increase the rate of new firm formation, often with the assistance of senior
employees from existing firms. 216 They show that noncompete enforceability
decreases the incidence of these important “liquidity events” in the founding of new
firms. 217 Starr, Balasubramanian, and Sakakibara (2017) found that higher
enforceability of noncompetes is associated with fewer “spin-off firms” within the
same industry as their predecessor, but the spin-off firms that do appear are larger,

209. Catharine L. Fisk, Reflections on the New Psychological Contract and Ownership of Human
Capital, 34 CONN. L. REV. 765 (2006); Rachel Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts and Worker
Mobility: The Dilution of Employee Bargaining Power via Standard Form Noncompetes, 2006 MICH. ST.
L. REV. 963 (2006).
210. Sullivan, supra note 124.
211. Starr, et al. (2020), supra note 208. In states where noncompetes are enforceable, employees
who are covered by such clauses have, on average, 11% longer job tenures, a 17% higher competitorspecific reservation wage, and a 54% greater likelihood of reporting that they will leave for a
noncompetitor relative to a competitor. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. (draft p. 30) Once again, the fact that noncompetes can have “spillover effects” on non-signers
complicates empirical tests of their impact resulting in underestimates when comparing workers who are
covered by a noncompete with those who are not. McAdams 2019, supra note 9, at 11.
214. Sampsa Samila & Olav Sorenson, Noncompete Covenants: Incentives to Innovate or
Impediments to Growth, 57 MGMT. SCIENCE 3, 425 (2011).
215. Id.
216. Toby E. Stuart & Olav Sorenson, Liquidity Events and the Geographic Distribution of
Entrepreneurial Activity, 48 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 175 (2003).
217. Id.
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faster growing, and have a higher likelihood of surviving.218 They argue that this
occurs because noncompetes raise the expected litigation costs for spin-offs, and
these costs dissuade smaller, less profitable, firms from forming. 219 Kang and
Fleming have found that the increased enforceability of noncompetes allows large
firms to add more establishments and grow, at the expense of new entrants. 220

IV. THE AMERICAN MOVEMENT FOR STATUTORY REFORM
As outlined in the previous section, there is a growing body of evidence that
more employers are abusing covenants not to compete, and that this abuse is having
a detrimental effect on workers’ wages, workers’ mobility, firm formation, and the
general health of the economy. This employer abuse can take the form of imposing
the noncompete: without advance notice or additional consideration; when less
intrusive alternative common law or contractual means could protect the employer’s
legitimate interest; when the employer has no legitimate interest to protect; or when
the noncompete is otherwise clearly unenforceable and prohibited by law. Even when
they are clearly unenforceable, the empirical evidence suggests that noncompetes
have a deleterious effect on the functioning of the labor market due to the in terrorem
effect they have on workers and competing employers and the fact that they raise
transaction costs in the labor market.
The deleterious impact of noncompetes on workers and the economy has not
gone unnoticed. In the last decade numerous scholars and policymakers have called
for legislative reform ranging from greater transparency in contracting to an outright
ban on noncomptetes.221 The Uniform Law Commission has undertaken the drafting
of a proposed uniform state law on noncompetes in hopes of facilitating useful reform
and promoting uniformity in state law on the subject. 222 In 2016, the Treasury
Department released an economic analysis of noncompetes in the United States
outlining many of the problems and suggesting possible reforms. 223 Later that same
year, the Obama White House produced a position paper 224 and then a “call to

218. Evan Starr, Natarajan Balasubramanian & Marik Sakakibara, Screening Spinouts?: How
Noncompete Enforceability Affects the Creation, Growth, and Survival of New Firms, 64 MGMT. SCI. 552
(2018).
219. Id.
220. Hyo Kang & Lee Fleming, Non-competes, Business Dynamism, and Concentration: Evidence
from a Florida Case Study, 29(3) J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 663 (2020).
221. Evan Starr, The Use, Abuse, and Enforceability of Non-Compete and No-Poach Agreements: A
Brief Review of the Theory, Evidence, and Recent Reform Efforts, Issue Brief of the Economic Innovation
Group (2019); Colvin & Shierholz, supra note 13; Lemley & Lobel, supra note 199.
222. Uniform Law Commission, Uniform Restrictive Employment Agreement Act, National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (Jul. 12, 2021)..
223. Treasury Report, supra note 125.
224. The White House, Non-Compete Agreements: Analysis of the Usage, Potential Issues, and State
Responses
(May
2016)
(hereafter
White
House
Report),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/non-competes_report_final2.pdf
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action”225 detailing the current abuse of noncompetes and urging state legislators to
address this abuse through legislative reform. Although interest in noncompetes
waned under the Trump administration, President Biden campaigned on a platform
of prohibiting such agreements.226 Indeed President Biden, campaigned to work with
Congress to produce federal legislation to “[e]liminate noncompete clauses and nopoaching agreements that hinder the ability of employees to seek higher wages, better
benefits, and working conditions by changing employers.”227 In 2022, the Treasury
Department produced a comprehensive report on the negative effects of noncompetes
and no-poach agreements on the U.S. economy.228
These calls for reform have resulted in action at both the federal and state level.
In 2015, Senators Murphy (D-Conn) and Franken (D-Minn) introduced the Mobility
and Opportunity for Vulnerable Employees Act (MOVE Act), which prohibited
noncompetes for low wage workers. 229 Although the Obama administration
supported the MOVE Act, the legislation never made it out of Committee. 230 In
2019, Senators Chris Murphy (D-Conn.) and Todd Young (R-Ind.) introduced the
Workforce Mobility Act (WMA) which would prohibit noncompetes nationwide,
except in conjunction with the sale of a business or the dissolution of a partnership,
and give the Department of Labor the power to fine employers attempting to enforce
such restrictive covenants.231 Also in 2019, Senator Marco Rubio (R-Fla) introduced
the Freedom to Compete Act (FCA) which would amend the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA) to prohibit noncompetes unless the employee is a bona fide executive,
administrative, professional, or salesperson who is exempt from the FLSA’s
minimum wage requirements.232 Reform may also come at the federal level in the
form of executive rulemaking under existing antitrust laws. In 2021, President Biden
issued an executive order encouraging the FTC to exercise its rulemaking authority
“to curtail the unfair use of noncompete clauses and other . . . agreements that may

225. The White House, State Call to Action on Non-Compete Agreements (Oct. 2016) (hereafter Call
to
Action),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/competition/noncompetescalltoaction-final.pdf.
226. The Biden Plan for Strengthening Worker Organizing, Collective Bargaining, and Unions,
https://joebiden.com/empowerworkers/ (last visited Jun. 12, 2021).
227. Id.
228. U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, The State of Labor Market Competition (Mar. 7, 2022).
229. See Mobility and Opportunity for Vulnerable Employees Act, S. 1504, 114th Cong. (2015–2016)
(hereinafter MOVE Act). In the MOVE Act, the protected low wage workers were those earning less than
$15 an hour, $31,200 per year, or the state or local minimum wage.
230. Anne Dunne & Erik Weibust, Democratic U.S. Senators Seek to Abolish Non-Compete
Agreements, SEYFARTH SHAW (May 2, 2018), https://www.tradesecretslaw.com/2018/05/articles
/legislation-2/democratic-u-s-senators-seek-to-abolish-non-compete-agreements/.
231. See Workforce Mobility Act of 2019, S. 2614, 116th Cong. (2019–2020); see also, Press Release,
Sen. Young, Young and Murphy Introduce Bill to Limit Non-Compete Agreements, Protect Workers (Oct.
17, 2019), https://www.young.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/young-and-murphy-introduce-bill-tolimit-non-compete-agreements-protect-workers.
232. See Freedom to Compete Act, S. 124, 116th Cong. (2019–2020); see also, Press Release, Sen.
Rubio, Rubio Introduces Bill to Protect Low-Wage Workers from Non-Compete Agreements (Jan. 15,
2019),
https://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2019/1/rubio-introduces-bill-to-protect-lowwage-workers-from-non-compete-agreements.
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unfairly limit worker mobility.”233 Pursuant to this presidential order, the FTC has
hosted a joint public workshop with the DOJ to discuss efforts to promote
competitive labor markets and worker mobility.234
Successful enactments of reform have been much more common at the state
level. Since 2015, twenty-two states and the District of Columbia have enacted or
amended noncompete statutes. 235 These enactments ranged from modest
amendments tinkering with statutory definitions to a flat prospective ban on the
enforcement of noncompetes in the District of Columbia. 236 At the time of this
writing, important state legislation concerning the enforcement of noncompetes is
being considered in over a dozen other states.237 These proposals for reform have
been put forth to remedy problems with the enforcement of noncompetes that are
apparent in the empirical literature. The reforms can be characterized as having four
basic objectives: to ensure notice, clarity and bargaining over noncompetes; to help
ensure employer legitimate interest in the noncompete; to discourage overly broad
noncompetes; and to completely ban noncompetes.

A. Proposals to Ensure Notice, Transparency, and
Bargaining Over Noncompetes
The empirical literature shows that lack of transparency and bargained for
exchange is a problem in the enforcement of noncompetes. Starr, Prescott, and
Bishara found that the workers who do not receive notice of the restrictive covenant
before accepting employment do not receive compensating wages and these workers
constitute 29.3% of those covered by noncompetes.238 Starr, Bishara, and Prescott
(2021) also find that only 10% of workers with noncompetes report bargaining over
their noncompete, with 38% of the non-bargainers not realizing that they could
negotiate.239 Moreover, Starr’s later work suggests that employers with a legitimate
interest to protect are more likely to give their employees advance notice of the

233. Exec. Order No. 14036, 86 Fed. Reg. 36987 (July 9, 2021).
234. See Fed. Trade Commission, Making Competition Work: Promoting Competition in Labor
Markets, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2021/10/ftc-doj-hold-virtual-public-workshopexploring-competition-labor; See also Dept. of Justice, Public Workshop on Promoting Competition in
Labor Markets, https://www.justice.gov/atr/events/public-workshop-promoting-competition-labormarkets.
235. Those states are: Alabama (2016), Arkansas (2015), Colorado (2018, 2021), District of Columbia
(2021), Florida (2020), Hawaii (2015), Idaho (2018), Illinois (2018, 2021), Louisiana (2020), Maine
(2019), Massachusetts (2018), Maryland (2019), Nevada (2017, 2021), New Mexico (2015), New
Hampshire (2019), North Dakota (2019), Oregon (2015, 2019, 2021), Rhode Island (2019), Texas (2019),
Utah (2018), Washington (2019), Virginia (2020), West Virginia (2017). Stewart Schwab, Report to the
Study Committee on Covenants Not to Compete Draft of September 4, 2019, Uniform Law Commission,
Table A-5 (Sep. 2019); Beck Reed & Riden, Fair Competition Law, New Map of Recent Changes to State
Noncompete Laws (Jun. 8, 2021), https://faircompetitionlaw.com/2021/06/08/new-map-of-recentchanges-to-state-noncompete-laws/.
236. Id., Schwab.
237. Id., Schwab, at Table A-6; Id., Reed & Riden.
238. Starr, Prescott & Bishara (2021), supra note 5, Table 7.
239. Id.
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noncompete. 240 Thus advance notice is not only an indication of bargained for
exchange and mutual benefit, but also a marker of whether the employer has a
legitimate interest to protect. Finally, arguments of equity and economic efficiency
require that agreements be based on transparency, understanding and mutual assent.
Absent these criteria there is no “meeting of the minds” and no reasonable
presumption that the agreement is mutually beneficial.
Accordingly, it is not surprising that the academics and policymakers have
over-whelmingly endorsed reforms to promote transparency and bargained for
exchange in noncompetes. In his policy analysis, Starr recommends that states adopt
laws promoting transparency including notice in advance of accepting a job or
promotion. 241 The Obama White House “Call to Action” on noncompetes also
recommends that states “promot[e] transparency in noncompetes” by enacting laws
that require advance notice and additional consideration for a noncompete to be
enforceable, and that require notice to employees on their rights under the law. 242
Finally, the Uniform Restrictive Employment Agreement Act drafted by the Uniform
Law Commission, requires that employees receive a written copy of any restrictive
employment agreement at least fourteen days before accepting or beginning work,
that they receive a separate notice in the preferred language of the worker, that they
receive a notice of penalties against an employer entering into a prohibited
agreement, and that the State Department of Labor shall prescribe the notice. 243
A variety of states have taken these recommendations to heart and passed or
considered laws to promote transparency and bargaining with respect to
noncompetes. In 2014, New Hampshire adopted a law that requires that noncompete
agreements be provided to potential employees prior to the acceptance of an offer of
employment; otherwise the noncompete is not enforceable. 244 Beginning in 2015,
Oregon adopted a more comprehensive set of notice requirements. 245 Oregon
requires that firms make clear whether employees will be expected to sign a
noncompete in advance of offer letters, the noncompete must be provided at least
two weeks before employment or with bona fide advancement, and the employer
must give post-termination notification of a written signed noncompete. 246
Massachusetts (2018), Maine (2019), and Washington (2019) soon followed suit and
all now require written notice in advance of hiring for noncompetes to be effective.247
240. Id.
241. Starr, Use and Abuse . . ., supra note 221, at p. 13.
242. White House Call to Action, supra note 225.
243. Uniform Law Commission, Uniform Restrictive Employment Agreement Act, National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Section 4. Notice Requirements (Jul. 12, 2021).
244. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275:70-a (2019).
245. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 653.295.
246. Id.
247. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26 § 599-A(4) (requiring employers disclose a noncompete before
making an offer of employment and providing them at least three days to consider); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 149, § 24L(b)(i) (requiring employers provide notice of a noncompete ten business days before
the commencement of employment or before formal offer of employment); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
49.62.020(1)(a)(i) (requiring employers to provide written notice of the terms of a noncompete no later
than time of the employee’s acceptance).
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In 2021, Illinois amended its Freedom to Work Act to stipulate that noncompete and
nonsolicitation covenants are void unless the employer complies with specific notice
requirements before the commencement of employment or before signing a
covenant.248 The District of Columbia requires employers to provide all covered
employees written notice that noncompetes are banned in the District of
Columbia.249 In addition some states, such as Massachusetts and Nevada, require
that independent consideration be given for any noncompete agreed to after
employment starts.250 These requirements help ensure that employees have notice
and an opportunity to look for other work before accepting the restriction, and thus
be more likely to share in the benefits of a noncompete. They also help insure legal
equity and the contractual requirement of a “meeting of the minds.”

B. Proposals to Help Ensure that the Employer has a Legitimate Interest:
Prohibiting Noncompetes for Low Wage Workers, Prohibiting
Noncompetes for Certain Occupations, and Requiring Garden Leaves
The empirical evidence suggests that employers often impose noncompetes on
employees even when the employer has no legitimate interest, and the restraint is
unenforceable. Starr, Prescott, and Bishara found that, even in California and North
Dakota where noncompetes are unenforceable, 19% of the workforce is covered by
a noncompete.251 Similarly, Colvin and Shierholz found that in California 29.3% of
business establishments required all of their employees to submit to noncompetes
even though they were unenforceable.252 Nationwide, Starr, Prescott, and Bishara
estimate that an hourly employee, in a private for-profit firm, earning $50,000 per
year, who does not have a college degree, and who does not have access to the
employer trade secrets, has a 13% chance of being covered by a noncompete.253
Even though they are unenforceable, these noncompetes have an in terrorem effect
on employee mobility and wages either because the employees do not understand
that noncompetes can be unenforceable or because they fear frivolous law suits.
These in terrorem effects on wages and mobility are not significantly different from
the wage and mobility declines suffered by workers with noncompetes in states
where enforcement is possible. 254 The common existence of unenforceable
covenants not to compete is a problem that cannot be ignored in the law. Academics
and policymakers have suggested several reforms to help ensure that employers have
a legitimate interest to protect before they impose a noncompete on an employee.
248. Employers must: 1) advise the employee in writing to consult with an attorney before entering
into the covenant; and 2) provide the employee with a copy of the covenant at least fourteen calendar days
before the commencement of employment or provide the employee with at least fourteen calendar days to
review the covenant before signing. See Illinois Freedom to Work Act of 2021, 820 ILCS § 90, Section
20 (2021).
249. Ban on Non-Compete Agreements Amendment Act of 2020, D.C. Code § 32–581.05 (2020).
250. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. c. 149, § 24L(b); NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.195.
251. Starr, Prescott & Bishara (2021), supra note 5, at 7 in draft.
252. Colvin & Shierholz, supra note 13, Table 2, at p. 6.
253. Starr, Prescott & Bishara (2021), supra note 5, at 8 in draft.
254. Starr et al. (2020), supra note 208, at 25 in draft.
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The most popular proposal to help ensure that the employer has a legitimate
interest is to prohibit noncompetes for low-wage workers.255 The thinking is that
low-wage workers are unlikely to have access to valuable employer information that
might be appropriated and that they have little bargaining power to resist the
imposition of an uncompensated noncompete. 256 Moreover, clear legislative
prohibitions based on certain levels of income or wages have the advantage that they
are easy to communicate to the public and cheap to enforce. The proposed Uniform
Restrictive Employment Agreement Act of the Uniform Laws Commission prohibits
application of a noncompete against workers whose earnings are less than the annual
mean wage of employees in the state.257 The proposed Act also prohibits application
of noncompetes to independent contractors, externs, interns, volunteers, apprentices,
sole proprietors, and certain service providers. 258 The 2015 federal MOVE Act
proposed to prohibit noncompetes for workers earning less than $15 an hour, $31,200
per year, or the state or local minimum wage.259 In the current Freedom to Compete
Act, Senator Rubio proposes to prohibit noncompetes for employees who are not
exempt from the wage and hours provisions of the FLSA.260 Currently, an employee
needs to be paid a salary of at least $35,568 a year to possibly qualify as an exempt
employee.261
Following this analysis, eleven states have enacted statutes that prohibit or
constrain the application of noncompetes to low wage workers, although they
disagree considerably on how to define who is a “low wage worker”.262 Most states,
like Oregon, Illinois, Maryland, New Hampshire, and Virginia tie the threshold for
protected low-wage workers to the minimum wage or some specified hourly, weekly
or annual amount.263 For example, New Hampshire prohibits noncompetes where an
employee earns an hourly rate less than 200% of the federal minimum wage264 while
Illinois voids them for employees making less than $75,000 per year.265 Washington
protects both low wage employees and low wage independent contractors from the
imposition of a noncompete, exempting employees who earn less than $107,301.04

255. Starr, Use and Abuse . . ., supra note 221, at p. 14; Lemley & Lobel, supra note 199, at 8–9;
Uniform Law Commission, Uniform Restrictive Employment Agreement Act, National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Section 5. Low Wage Worker (Jul. 12, 2021).
256. Starr, Use and Abuse . . ., supra note 221, at p. 14.
257. Uniform Law Commission, Uniform Restrictive Employment Agreement Act, National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Section 5. Low Wage Worker (Jul. 12, 2021).
258. Id., Uniform Law Commission, Uniform Restrictive Employment Agreement Act, Section 2.
Definitions, and Section 5. Low Wage Worker.
259. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
260. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
261. 84 Fed. Reg. 51230 et. seq. (Sept. 27, 2019).
262. The ten states are Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Nevada, Oregon,
Rhode Island, Virginia, and Washington.
263. OR. REV. STAT. §653.295; 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 90/5; MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. §
3-716 (West 2019); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275:70-a (2019); VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-28.7:8.
264. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275:70-a(I)(b).
265. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 90/5.
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per year and independent contractors who earning less than $268,252.59 per year.266
Idaho defines low wage workers in the negative by limiting the application of
noncompetes to high paid “key employees.”267 Other states, including Massachusetts
and Rhode Island, prohibit noncompetes for employees who are not exempt from the
wage and hour provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act. 268 Massachusetts and
Rhode Island also prohibit noncompetes for students, interns, short-term employees
and minors.269 Nevada exempts “hourly employees.”270 Finally, Rhode Island and
Maine base their threshold for low-wage exemption on the federal poverty level.271
Specifying that noncompetes are prohibited for certain easily identifiable categories
of workers, and in particular low-wage workers, seems a promising avenue for
addressing many employer abuses of noncompetes.

266. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.62.030(1).
267. “Key employees” are defined as those “who, by reason of the employer’s investment . . . have
gained a high level of inside knowledge, influence, credibility, notoriety, fame, reputation or public
persona as a representative or spokesperson of the employer.” IDAHO CODE §§44-2702 (1). An employee
is presumed a “key employee” if he or she is among the highest paid 5% of employees in the company.
IDAHO CODE §§44-2702 (2)
268. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 24L(c).
269. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-59-3(a)(3); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. c. 149, § 24L(c).
270. NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.195.
271. R.I. GEN. L. § 28-59-2 (2019) (“low-wage employee” means an employee whose average annual
earnings, as defined in subsection (2), are not more than two hundred fifty percent (250%) of the federal
poverty level for individuals as established by the United States Department of Health and Human
Services federal poverty guidelines); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26 § 599-A (3) (Maine classifies low wage
employees as those earning less than or equal to 400 percent of the federal poverty level annually).
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Table 1: States with Existing or Proposed Statutes Voiding Noncompetes
for Low-Wage Workers
Definition
Hourly Wage
Annual Income FLSA
Specific
Low-Wage
NonCategories
Worker
Exempt of Workers
States with MD (<$15/hr)
IL (< $75K*)
MA
ID (Non-Key)
MA, RI, VA
Existing
NH (< 2 x FMW)
ME (< 4 x Pov Lev)
OR
(Students,
Statutes
NV (Paid Hrly Basis)
MD (< $31K)
RI
Interns,
Short-term
and Minor
Employees)

OR (< $100K*)
RI (< 2.5 x Pov Lev)
VA (< $58K)
WA (< $107K*)

States with
Pending
or Past
Proposals

CO, KY, NJ, NY,
OK (< SAWW)
CT (< 3 x SMW)
HA, IN, TX (< $15/hr)

IA (< $14.5/hr)
MO (Paid Hrly Basis)
PA (< $30/hr)
VA (<1.5 SAWW)

MN (< SAAW)
MO (< $75K)
VT (< SAAW)
WV (<SAAW)

NJ

KY, NJ
(Students,
Interns,
Short-term
and Minor
Employees)

Key: SAWW = Statewide Average Weekly Wage; SAAW = Statewide Average Annual Wage;
FMW = Federal Min Wage; SMW = State Min (or Fair) Wage; * = adjusts with inflation
Sources: Stewart J. Schwab, Report to the Study Committee on Covenants Not to Compete Uniform
Law Commission, Draft of December 13, 2019, Table a-4; Beck Reed Riden, 50 State Noncompete
Chart (6/27/21)

Generally presented as a balancing of employer and societal interests, some
reformers also seek to prohibit noncompetes for certain occupations. Starr argues for
exemption of healthcare providers and tech workers; the first on the basis of patient
choice and the second on the basis of economic vitality and growth.272 Similarly, the
2016 White House report argues for the exemption of healthcare workers, broadly
defined, as a matter of “consumer choice.” 273 The prohibition on noncompetes
enjoyed by lawyers under the ABA’s Rules of Professional Conduct is generally
justified on the basis of client freedom of choice.274 As of 2019, eleven states and
the District of Columbia had enacted bans or substantial limitations on noncompetes
for physicians, and eight more were actively considering such legislation.275 In 2015,
Hawaii banned noncompetes and non-solicitation agreements for employees of a
“technology business,” which the Act defines as one that “derives the majority of its
gross income from . . . products or services resulting from . . . software development

272.
273.
274.
275.

Starr, Use and Abuse . . ., supra note 221, at p. 14.
White House Report, supra note 224, at p. 14.
Id.
Schwab, supra note 25 at Appendix Table A-2.
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or information technology development, or both.”276 The stated purpose of the Act
was “to stimulate Hawaii’s economy by prohibiting . . . restrictive covenants that
forbid post-employment competition for employees of technology businesses.”277
Another sixteen states and the District of Columbia have restrictions on covenants
not to compete for other professions, including broadcasters, healthcare workers,
secretaries, clerks, beauticians, and cosmologists.278
Another way to ensure that the employer has a legitimate interest in the
noncompete is to require that a “garden leave” be paid by the employer to the
employee during the period of noncompetition. Initially, “garden leaves” were
contractual provisions applied to top executives in Europe and the United States that
provided for periods after they had left their job during which they were paid full
wages and benefits not to work, and in particular not to work for a competitor. 279
Drawing on this idea, some have argued that by requiring employers to pay some
significant “garden leave” to the employee during the duration of the noncompete
would help ensure that the employer had a legitimate interest in the constraint and
ensure compensation to the employee for the constraint.280 In 2016, Oregon adopted
a statute that made voidable noncompetes for certain low-wage employees, unless
the employer paid a garden leave equal to the greater of: (1) 50% of the employee’s
annual gross base salary and commissions at the time of the employee’s termination,
or (2) 50% of the median family income for a four-person family.281 In 2021, Oregon
amended its garden leave provision to require that the employer agree in a writing to
pay compensation to make noncompetes enforceable for certain low-wage
workers. 282 In 2018, Massachusetts followed suit adopting a statute that requires
employers to provide pay equal to 50% of the employee’s base pay, or other
“mutually agreed upon consideration,” during the period of the noncompete.283 The
statute makes clear, however, that the garden leave pay requirement only runs (i) if
the employer chooses to enforce the restrictions; (ii) so long as the employee is in
compliance with the agreement; and (iii) up to a maximum of one (1) year.284 Finally,
in 2019 Washington state adopted a statute specifying that employers who lay off an

276. Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 480-4 (West).
277. Robert B. Milligan, Hawaii Bans Non-Compete and Non-Solicit Agreements with Technology
Workers, SEYFARTH SHAW (July 6, 2015) https://www.tradesecretslaw.com/2015/07/articles/tradesecrets/hawaii-bans-non-compete-and-non-solicit-agreements-with-technology-workers/.
278. The states limiting or voiding noncompetes on broadcasters include: Arizona, Connecticut,
Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, New York, Oregon, Utah and Washington. See Schwab, supra note 25 at
Appendix Table A-3. Other exempted professions include: “professionals” (Alabama), medical, veterinary
and social workers (Arkansas), government contractors (Illinois), accountants (Louisiana), nurses, social
workers and psychologists (Massachusetts), secretaries and clerks (Missouri), in-house counsel and
psychologists (New Jersey), a variety of health professionals (New Mexico), home healthcare workers
(Oregon), beauticians and cosmetologists (Vermont). See Beck, supra note 69.
279. Howard J. Rubin & Gregg A. Gilma, Will Garden Leaves Blossom in the States?, 33 EMP. REL.
L.J. 1 (2007).
280. Starr, Use and Abuse . . ., supra note 221, at p. 13.
281. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 653.295(6).
282. S. 169, 81st Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2021).
283. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 24L(b)(vii).
284. Id.
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employee must provide compensation equivalent to the laid-off employee’s base
salary for the duration of the restraint in order to enforce a noncompete. 285 This
“garden pay” requirement is net compensation earned by the employee through other
employment during the period of enforcement.286

C. Proposals to Discourage Overly-Broad Noncompetes
Even if the employer has a legitimate interest to support a noncompete, it is
important that the noncompete be narrowly drafted to protect just that legitimate
interest. American law draws some very fine lines in the enforcement of
noncompetes, and it is easy to see how employees, potential employers, and even
advising attorneys might not always be sure the exact limits of an employer’s interest
that a court will protect. Moreover, as Starr, Prescott, and Bishara have shown, even
clearly overbroad and unenforceable noncompetes have a negative effect on
employee wages, mobility and the vibrancy of our economy.287
There are a variety of proposed and adopted reforms to address the problem of
overly broad and unenforceable noncompetes. The traditional solution, adopted to
date by three states, 288 and recommended in the White House in its “Call to
Action,”289 is for states to adopt the “red pencil” doctrine and refuse to reform and
enforce overbroad noncompetes.290 The Uniform Covenants Not to Compete Act of
the Uniform Law Commission reins in noncompete reformation providing two
options: (1) a complete prohibition on reformation, or (2) allowing limited
reformation only when the employer “reasonably and in good faith believed the
agreement was enforceable”. 291 Theoretically this would have given employers
incentive to draft noncompetes narrowly so that they would be enforced.
Unfortunately, this remedy is opaque and hard to communicate to the public and does
nothing about the large number of noncompetes that are clearly unenforceable but
used by employers for their in terrorem effect. Perhaps for this reason this remedy
was omitted from the final uniform law proposal.

285. WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 49.62.005.
286. Id.
287. Starr et al. (2020), supra note 208.
288. Nebraska, Virginia, and Wisconsin. In addition, two states, New Mexico and Utah, have not yet
decided the question, and three states, California, North Dakota and Oklahoma, do not enforce
employment noncompetes. See Beck, supra note 69. See also, Vlasin v. Len Johnson & Co., Inc., 455
N.W.2d 772 (NE S. Ct. 1990)(It is not the function of the courts to reform unreasonable covenants not to
compete solely for the purpose of making them legally enforceable.); Pitchford v. Oakwood Mobile
Homes, 124 F. Supp. 2d 958, 965 (W.D. Va. 2000) (reiterating that Virginia courts refuse to adopt any
version of the blue pencil doctrine to avoid rewriting the contract on behalf of the parties); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 103.465 (West 1988) (“[A]ny covenant, described in this subsection, imposing an unreasonable
restraint is illegal, void and unenforceable even as to any part of the covenant or performance that would
be a reasonable restraint.”).
289. White House Call to Action, supra note 225.
290. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
291. Uniform Law Commission, Uniform Restrictive Employment Agreement Act, National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Section 16. Enforcement and Remedy (Jul. 12,
2021).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3870403

2022]

THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE

627

Another solution to address the overbreadth of noncompetes, is to adopt a
statutory presumptions or maximums for the scope of noncompetes. Several states,
either by court opinion or statute, have established a presumptively reasonable
duration or a maximum duration for such covenants, most often two years. 292 Idaho
has gone further, establishing presumptions of reasonableness with respect to
duration (eighteen months), geographic area (where employee services or had
significant presence or influence), and activity (the line of business in which
employee worked).293 In 2021, Oregon’s noncompete statute reduced the maximum
duration of a noncompete to twelve months, down from eighteen months.294 Other
states could adopt useful statutory presumptions of reasonableness or maximums
with respect to the duration, geographic scope, and activities covered by
noncompetes. However, this solution still leaves open the problem of the in terrorem
effect of unenforceable noncompetes.
A more comprehensive solution, suggested by the White House Call to Action,
is to assess administrative fines or create a private cause of action, with damages,
class actions and attorney’s fees, for overbroad noncompetes. 295 This solution
appears in the Uniform Restrictive Employment Agreement Act currently approved
by the Uniform Law Commission296 which makes the imposition of a noncompete
the employer “knows or reasonably should know” is unenforceable a civil violation
subject to statutory damages of not more than $5,000 per worker per agreement for
each violation. 297 The Act also allows declaratory judgements that a covenant is
unenforceable and gives the challenging party attorney’s fees and damages.298 Some
state Attorney Generals have exercised the state’s parens patriae power to sue major
employers to rescind unreasonable covenants not to compete that those employers
had imposed on their employees. 299 In California, where noncompetes are
unenforceable, a court has held that the only reason for inclusion of a clearly non-

292. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
293. Id.
294. Senate Bill 169, 81st Oregon Legislative Assembly--2021 Regular Session. .
295. White House Call to Action, supra note 225.
296. Uniform Law Commission, Uniform Restrictive Employment Agreement Act, National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Section 16. Enforcement and Remedy (Jul. 12,
2021).
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. In 2016, Illinois State Attorney General Lisa Madigan sued Jimmy John’s to rescind the
unreasonable covenants not to compete those companies had imposed on their employees. Office of the
Attorney General of Illinois (OAG Illinois). 2016b. “Madigan Sues Jimmy John’s for Imposing Unlawful
Non-compete Agreements on Sandwich Makers and Delivery Drivers” (press release). June 8, 2016.
Office of the Attorney General of Illinois (OAG Illinois). 2016a. “Madigan Announces Settlement with
Jimmy John’s for Imposing Unlawful Non-compete Agreements” (press release). December 7, 2016. New
York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman has also reached several settlements in relation to employers’
use of noncompete agreements. Office of the Attorney General of New York (OAG New York). 2016e.
“A.G. Schneiderman Announces Settlement with Jimmy John’s to Stop Including Non-compete
Agreements in Hiring Packets” (press release). June 22, 2016; Office of the Attorney General of New
York (OAG New York). 2016f. “A.G. Schneiderman Announces Settlement with Major Legal News
Website Law360 to Stop Using Non-compete Agreements for Its Reporters” (press release). June 15,
2016.
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enforceable noncompete is to “mislead people,” 300 and awarded penalties and
attorneys’ fees to the plaintiff under California’s Private Attorneys General Act.301
The 2020 Washington statute discourages overbroad noncompetes by imposing a
$5,000 minimum in damages, plus attorney fees and costs, if a court or arbitrator
reforms, rewrites, modifies, or only partially enforces a noncompete. 302 In 2021,
Illinois amended its Freedom to Work Act to discourage overbroad noncompete
clauses by requiring employers to pay monetary damages, statutory penalties,
attorney’s fees, equitable relief and other appropriate relief for entering into or
attempting to enforce unlawful noncompete agreements. 303 In enforcing its
prospective ban on noncompetes, the District of Columbia makes employers liable
to employees for $500–$1,000 for an initial violation of the act and at least $3,000
for each subsequent violation and allows the Mayor to assess administrative penalties
of $350–$1,000 for violations of the act.304 Similarly, the Workforce Mobility Act
proposes an amount not to exceed $5,000 as a civil penalty, payable to the employee,
for employers who violate its limitations on noncompetes or notice requirements.305
Fines and private causes of action would seem one way to discourage employers
from imposing clearly overbroad and unenforceable noncompetes on employees.

D. Proposals for a Complete Ban on Noncompetes
The empirical evidence suggests that noncompetes are an important drag on the
U.S. labor market. Empirical estimates of the percent of the American workforce
they cover vary from 18.1% to 27.8%, much more than can be justified by the
economic arguments in favor of noncompetes. 306 Starr, Prescott, and Bishara have
estimated that noncompetes decrease wages by an average 4%, nationwide, including
those not covered by a noncompete.307 Johnson, Lavetti and Lipsitz estimate that
moving from a legal regime of noncompete unenforceability to a regime with the
highest level of enforceability observed in the United States would reduce the monthto-month probability of workers changing jobs by 26.1%. 308 Moreover, under our
elaborate common law and statutory scheme for regulating noncompetes, we do not
seem to do a very good job of separating those employees for whom a noncompete
might be useful and beneficial from those for whom it is an extension of employer
market power. As Starr, Prescott, and Bishara have shown, even employees who are
300. Robinson v. U-Haul Co. of California, 4 Cal. App. 5th 304, 312(2016).
301. California Legislative Information, Part 13. The Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of
2004 (2698–2699.5), available at https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displayText.xhtml
?lawCode=LAB&division=2.&title=&part=13.&chapter=&article (last accessed Dec. 2018).
302. WASH REV. CODE § 49.62.080 (2019).
303. Illinois Freedom to Work Act of 2021, supra note 248.
304. Ban on Non-compete Agreements Amendment Act of 2020, supra note 249.
305. Workforce Mobility Act of 2021, S. 483, 117th Cong. Section 6 (b) (2) (2021-2022).
306. Starr, Prescott & Bishara (2021), supra note 5, (18.1%); Colvin & Shierholz, supra note 13,
(27.8%).
307. Starr, Prescott & Bishara (2021), supra note 5, at 14 and Table 9 in draft; see also, Starr, Consider
this . . ., supra note 144.
308. Johnson et al. (2019), supra note 181.
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covered by clearly unenforceable noncompetes suffer in terrorem diminution in
wages and mobility that is not significantly different from employees covered by a
noncompete that might be enforced.309
As a result, some commentators and policy makers have suggested that we
should adopt a complete ban on employee noncompetes and leave employers to
protect investments in trade secrets and customer connections through trade secret
law, do not disclose provisions, do not solicit provisions, or perhaps not at all. Starr
has advocated for a complete ban on noncompetes arguing that it will help spur the
spread of technology and economic growth.310 Lobel has perhaps been the strongest
advocate for a complete ban, extolling the virtues of setting talent free for the
economy and society. 311 Colvin and Shierholz advocate for federal legislation
prohibiting the application of employment noncompetes as a means of simplifying
enforcement issues and improving the economy. 312 Finally, we have Gilson’s
famous case study arguing that the dominance of the Silicon Valley over other
possible high tech corridoes like Route 128 in Massachusetts is in large part due to
the fact that noncompetes are not enforceable in the state of California. 313
As previously mentioned, three states and the District of Columbia have
adopted blanket prohibitions on the enforcement of covenants not to compete. In
1865, the Dakota Territory adopted the “Field Code,” a statutory simplification of
the common law, which prohibited covenants not to compete. 314 This enactment
survives today in the North Dakota Century Code § 9-08-06 which specifies that “[a]
contract by which anyone is restrained from exercising a lawful profession, trade, or
business of any kind is to that extent void, except [ancillary to the sale of a business
or the dissolution of a partnership].”315 California adopted the Field Code in 1872,
followed by Oklahoma in 1890, including language regarding employee
noncompetes very similar to that in the North Dakota statute. 316 California courts
have consistently affirmed that Section 16600 of the California Business and
Professions Code embodies a settled legislative policy favoring “open competition

309. See Starr et al., (2020), supra note 208, at 635.
310. Starr, Use and Abuse . . , supra note 221, at 14.
311. Lobel, supra note 12; Lemley & Lobel, supra note 199, at p. 2–3.
312. Colvin & Shierholz, supra note 13, at p. 12.
313. Gilson, supra note 139.
314. Andrew P. Morriss, Scott J. Burnham, & James C. Nelson, Debating the Field Civil Code 105
Years Late, 61 MONT. L. REV. 371, at 373 (2000). See also, JacksonLewis, North Dakota Non-compete
Law
Shares
History
with
California,
(Jan.
17,
2013)
https://www.restrictivecovenantreport.com/2013/01/north-dakota-non-compete-law-shares-history-withcalifornia/.
315. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06.
316. SEE CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §16600; 15 O.S. §217; Brandon Kemp, Non-competes in
Oklahoma Mergers and Acquisitions, 88 OKLAHOMA BAR J. 128 (2017). Montana also adopted this
language from the Field Code, MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-703, and is sometimes thought to prohibit
noncompetes, but Montana courts have interpreted the language only to prohibit complete restraint on an
employee’s work. Wrigg v. Junkermier, Clark, Campanella, Stevens, P.C., 362 Mont. 496, 503–07 (Mont.
2011). See also, Russel Beck, Montana allows non-competes! (Only California, Oklahoma, and North
Dakota don’t.), FAIR COMPETITION LAW (Jan. 30, 2021) https://faircompetitionlaw.com
/2021/01/30/montana-allows-non-competes-only-california-oklahoma-and-north-dakota-dont/.
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and employee mobility” and protecting the right of all Californians to “engage in
businesses and occupations of their choosing.” 317 The Oklahoma language has
evolved over time but still expressly allows employees to work in the same business
as that conducted by their former employer, regardless of a noncompete, “as long as
the former employee does not directly solicit the sale of goods, services or a
combination of goods and services from the established customers of the former
employer.”318
Although still not the most discussed reform, the idea of a flat prohibition on
the enforcement of noncompetes has gained momentum at both the state and national
level. The District of Columbia recently passed a statute to join North Dakota,
California and Oklahoma in prohibiting the enforcement of noncompetes. 319 The
D.C. statute invalidates noncompetes entered into after the applicability date of the
Act (postponed to October 1, 2022), except incident to the sale of a business. 320 The
Act requires employers to provide notice of the Act to existing D.C. employees
within ninety days of the Act’s applicability date and to new D.C. employees within
seven days of hire.321 Employers who violate the Act face administrative penalties
and potential civil liability to affected employees.322 As previously mentioned, at the
federal level Senators Murphy and Young have introduced the Workforce Mobility
Act (WMA), which would prohibit noncompetes nationwide except incident to the
sale of a business or the dissolution of a partnership.323 The Department of Labor
and FTC would share enforcement power through fines, and an employee forced to
sign a noncompete would have a private cause of action against their employer.324
The bill explicitly permits employers to protect investments in information by
requiring workers to sign agreements not to disclose trade secrets. 325 The fact that
this proposal is bipartisan gives some hope that it may become law during the Biden
administration although some legislators see a total prohibition as too harsh and
would prefer to focus on legislation protecting low-wage workers.326

317. Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 44 Cal. 4th 937, 946 (2008).
318. Title 15 O.S. 2001 § 219A. Contracts in contradiction of this law are declared “void and
unenforceable.” Title 15 O.S. 2001 § 219B.
319. See Guy Brenner & Caroline Guensberg, DC Mayor Signs Act Creating Near Total Ban on NonCompete Agreements for DC Employees, PROSKAUER (Jan. 13, 2021), https://www.lawandthe
workplace.com/2021/01/dc-mayor-signs-act-creating-near-total-ban-on-non-compete-agreements-fordc-employees/.
320. Ban on Non-compete Agreements Amendment Act of 2020, supra note 249, Section 102 (b).
The Act will become effective after enforcement monies are included in an approved DC budget, probably
in October of 2021. Id. The Act became law in March 2021 and the Act’s applicability date was postponed
to April 1, 2022.
321. Id., Section 102 (e)(1).
322. Id., Section 6 (a)(2)(B).
323. Workforce Mobility Act of 2021, supra note 305. The bill would allow the purchaser of a
business to enforce a noncompete agreement to protect the business’s goodwill by preventing the seller
from establishing a similar business within a certain geographic area; a similar exception is created for the
dissolution of a partnership. Id.
324. Id., Section 6 (d).
325. Id., Section 4.
326. S. HRG. 116-233, Noncompete Agreements and American Workers (2019).
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V. CONCLUSIONS
The abuse of covenants not to compete by employers is an important problem
in the American labor market that requires reform. Although noncompetes are
sometimes used to the mutual benefit of employers and high paid employees with
access to valuable appropriable information, all too often they are imposed, en masse,
on low wage workers, after employment has been accepted, without a legitimate
employer interest, and to the detriment of employee wages, employee mobility, and
the vibrancy and economy. This is because the common law doctrine yields few
simple rules on the enforceability of noncompetes that are easily communicated to
employers and employees, and even fewer penalties for employers who seek to
impose unenforceable constraints. At a minimum, states or the federal government
should take efforts to confine the application of noncompetes to high paid employees
with access to valuable appropriable information where the employee has notice of
the noncompete in advance of accepting employment and a real opportunity to
bargain for compensating wages. This can be done with laws voiding noncompetes
for workers below a certain income or in certain occupations, requiring advance
notice of the noncompete, and providing fines, declaratory judgments, civil penalties
and attorney’s fees to enforce these rules.
Even though there are some noncompetes that benefit both the employer and
employee, the common occurrence of noncompetes that are overbroad and/or clearly
unenforceable has an important deleterious impact on the American labor market and
our economy. The “blue pencil” doctrine that prevails in most states and allows
courts to reform overbroad noncompetes encourages employers to draft broadly and
let the courts later sort out what can be enforced. Even in states where noncompetes
are unenforceables, the clauses are almost as common as they are in states where
they can be enforced. Either because employees and employers don’t understand that
noncompetes can be unenforceable, or because they fear frivolous lawsuits, these
unenforceable noncompetes have an in terrorem negative impact on workers’ wages
and mobility that is not significantly different from the impact in states where the
clauses can be enforced. At a minimum, states or the federal government should take
steps to discourage the drafting of overbroad and clearly unenforceable
noncompetes. These steps could include adopting the “red pencil” doctrine of
striking down overbroad noncompetes and providing declaratory judgments, civil
penalties, attorney’s fees and fines to enforce these rules. Although the red pencil
doctrine gives employers incentive to draft noncompetes narrowly, without civil and
administrative remedies and penalties employers still might draft clearly
unenforceable noncompetes just for the in terrorem effect.
Finally, even though there are some noncompetes that benefit both the
employer and employee, it is not clear that the benefits of the increased employer
investment they foster outweigh the costs of policing these agreements and the
declines they cause in labor mobility, technology transfer and economic growth.
Although elegant, the common law doctrine on this subject is difficult to master.
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Without talented legal advice, most employees and many employers do not
understand their rights and responsibilities under the law. They commonly make
decisions assuming that unreasonable noncompetes are enforceable and preclude
valuable economic actions. California, and in particular the Silicon Valley, seems to
have thrived under a regime in which noncompetes are unenforceable, while other
parts of the country wish they could jump start their high-tech industry. Accordingly,
it is also appropriate for states and the federal government to consider a complete
prohibition on employee noncompetes. Employers could protect their legitimate
investments in appropriable information through the narrower remedies of trade
secret law, nondisclosure clauses, and nonsolicitation clauses. The case for allowing
employers to go further to prohibit competition by enforcing noncompetes is difficult
to make.
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APPENDIX
Table 1A: Reported Noncompete Coverage by Employee Characteristics
(2014)
Characteristic

% Currently
Bound by
Noncompete

% Ever
Bound by
Noncompete

Characteristic

Employer Class

% Currently
Bound by
Noncompete

% Ever
Bound by
Noncompete

Annual Earnings

Privt For-Profit

19.0%

38.8%

< $40,000

13.3%

33.0%

Privt Nonprofit

9.8%

28.6%

>= $40,000

25.2%

45.6%

Pub Healthcare

12.4%

37.8%

Gender
Female

17.3%

36.3%

Male

18.8%

39.7%

Confidential Information
Works with
Clients
Access to
Client Info

14.9%

35.6%

16.0%

36.2%

Access to

32.6%

54.9%

7.8%

26.9%

Trade Secrets

Age in Years

None

Under 40

20.6%

38.7%

40 or Older

15.6%

37.5%

Employer Size (# Employees in Firm)
< 25

11.6%

33.6%

Highest Level of Education

25 to 100

17.7%

36.5%

< Bach Degree

14.3%

34.7%

101 to 250

19.1%

40.6%

Bach Degree

25.0%

43.8%

251 to 500

22.3%

40.9%

> Bach Degree

30.0%

49.0%

501 to 1,000

16.8%

39.1%

1,001 - 2,500

21.2%

42.3%

Compensation Type
Hourly

14.0%

33.7%

2,501 - 5,000

21.0%

44.2%

Salary

27.5%

47.7%

> 5,000

21.5%

38.3%

Other

23.6%

45.9%

Overall

18.1%

38.1%

Source: Evan Starr, JJ Prescott and Norman Bishara, Noncompete Agreements in the U.S.
Labor Force, 64(1) J. of Law & Econ. 53–84 (2021). Table 5
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Table 2A: Percent of Workers Who Report Being Covered by a
Noncompete by Occupation and Industry (2014)
Occupation

% of Workers
Covered

Industry

% of Workers
Covered

Farm, Fish, Forestry

6%

Agriculture

9%

Legal

10%

Accommodation, Food

10%

Grounds Maintenance

11%

Arts, Entertainment

10%

Food Prep, Serving

11%

Construction

11%

Construction

12%

Real Estate

12%

Transport., Mat. Moving

12%

Transport., Warehousing

12%

Office

14%

Retail

14%

Community, Social Serv.

15%

Other Services

16%

Sales

16%

Mgmt. of Companies

17%

Production

16%

Healthcare

18%

Physician, Technical

18%

Education

18%

Education, Training

19%

Mining

19%

Management

19%

Utilities

20%

Architecture, Engineering

19%

Manufacturing

22%

Installation, Repair

21%

Admin Supp., Waste Mgt.

23%

Life, Physical, Social Sci.

22%

Finance and Insurance

25%

Protective Services

23%

Wholesale

31%

Arts, Entertainment

25%

Prof. Scientific, Technical

31%

Personal Care

26%

Business, Finance

30%

Healthcare Support

35%

Computer, Mathematical

36%

Information
32%
Source: Evan Starr, JJ Prescott and
Norman Bishara, Noncompete Agreements
in the U.S. Labor Force, 64(1) J. of Law &
Econ. 53–84 (2021).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3870403

2022]

THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE

635

Table 3A: Noncompete Agreements in U.S. Workplaces, by State
State (in order of
population size)

Sample
Size

Share of Workplaces Where
all Employees are Subject to
Noncompete Agreements

Share of Workplaces Where
any Employees are Subject to
Noncompete Agreements

California

82

29.3%

45.1%

Texas

28

50.0%**

60.7%

Florida

28

39.3%

46.4%

New York

43

23.3%

44.2%

Illinois

28

14.3%**

50.0%

Pennsylvania

45

31.1%

42.2%

Ohio

27

44.3%

66.7%*

Georgia

35

34.3%

51.4%

North Carolina

31

29.0%

51.6%

Michigan

29

37.9%

55.2%

New Jersey

43

25.6%

48.8%

Virginia

28

46.4%*

64.3%

Source: Alexander J.S. Colvin and Heidi Shierholz, Noncompete agreements Ubiquitous,
harmful to wages and to competition December 10, 2019
* Denotes result is significantly different from mean at 0.10 level.
** Denotes result is significantly different from mean at 0.05 level.
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